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EDITORIAL 
 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL TRAINING RE  
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS 
 
We are pleased to present the latest issue of the Compliance Elliance Journal (CEJ). 
 
In this edition, we will focus on legal education and professional training re compliance 
and ethics.  
 
 
This edition begins with a piece called “Rethinking Compliance – Essential Corner-
Stones For More Effectiveness In Compliance Management,” written by Prof. Dr. 
Stephan Grüninger and Lisa Schöttl. In the light of how companies dealt with Compli-
ance Management in the past, the two authors critically examine a more effective way of 
Compliance. They call it „Compliance Management 2.0“. As they consider neutraliza-
tion techniques to be often linked with non-compliant behavior, they underline the 
meaning of ethical principles. Moreover they point out some further indispensable 
points when it comes to questions round about effectiveness of Compliance Manage-
ment Systems. Without giving too much away: moral foundation, attainable goals and 
the role model function of top managers play an essential role according to the authors. 
 
In the subsequent article „Cognitive Dissonance As A Prevention Strategy“ Prof. Dr. 
Hendrik Schneider takes up in depth the just mentioned problem of neutralization 
strategies. He demonstrates the connection between techniques of neutralization and 
applied economic criminology. In doing so he creates a link between Michael Walter's 
statements of the perpetrator to the offense based on the theory of techniques of neu-
tralization and well structured compliance programs. The author emphasizes the mean-
ing of in-depth programs, in order to guarantee internally prevention measures. Accord-
ing to the author, the “tone from the top” should not be underestimated when it comes 
to neutralization strategies. 
 
Thereafter, Dr. Rita Shackel turns to various potential sources of conflicts of interest in 
decision-making by professionals in her essay titled “The Role Of Intellectual Beliefs 
And Professional Culture As A Source Of Potential Conflicts Of Interest”. The author 
underlines the need for more open and honest cross-disciplinary conversations regarding 
the way conflicts of interest are constructed and navigated in different scholarly and 
professional contexts. In doing so potential conflicts of interest could be uncovered. 
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This edition then turns to an article about Integrity Management. Dr. Daniel Dietz-
felbinger sees Integrity Management from a different angle. In his piece “Integrity Cul-
tures As A Forward-Looking Success Factor: A Practical Example” he exposes Integrity 
Management as a proactive control factor of support in the implementation of strategic 
goals. On the basis of a practical example he shows the path about how Integrity Man-
agement becomes a fundamental module in implementing the strategy. 
 
 
Finally, Tiezheng Li provides some insights into the world of Compliance Management 
and Compliance Training in China. Starting from the previous understanding of com-
pliance, he shows the wind of change regarding the meaning of Compliance Manage-
ment in China. According to Li a growing awareness of compliance can be recognized 
among Chinese domestic non-financial companies. In addition, he points out the im-
portance of Compliance Training within the scope of an effective Compliance Man-
agement System. In doing so the author also takes the opportunity to discuss some typi-
cal culture challenges, which occurred during Compliance Trainings for Chinese com-
panies. 
 
 
We hope you enjoy our fall edition! 
 
With our best regards, 
 
 
 
Michele DeStefano & Dr. Hendrik Schneider 
Founders and Content Curators of CEJ 
 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 2   2017 
PAGE  3 
RETHINKING COMPLIANCE – ESSENTIAL CORNERSTONES 
FOR MORE EFFECTIVENESS IN COMPLIANCE MANAGE-
MENT* 
Stephan Grüninger & Lisa Schöttl 
AUTHOR 
Stephan Grüninger is Professor for Managerial Economics at the University of Applied 
Sciences Konstanz (HTWG), Germany. He is Director of the Konstanz Institute of Cor-
porate Governance (KICG) and the Center for Business Compliance & Integrity (CBCI). 
In addition, he is director of the Forum Compliance & Integrity (FCI) and the Forum 
Compliance Mittelstand (FCM) which serve as active forums for discussions and ex-
change of experiences for managers who are responsible for the implementation and reali-
zation of Integrity and Compliance Management. He is one of the editors of the German 
book “Handbook Compliance-Management”. From 2002 to 2009, Stephan Grüninger 
worked in the field of management consulting and advisory, focussing on anti-fraud and 
Compliance Management as well as fraud investigation; in his last position before being 
appointed Professor at the HTWG he was a Partner at Ernst & Young (EY) Germany. 
 
Lisa Schöttl is a Senior Consultant in the Risk Consulting unit at PwC. She wrote her 
doctoral thesis on the topic of Integrity Management in business. Lisa Schöttl completed 
her studies in Political Science, Management and Business Ethics at the universities of 
Konstanz, Jena (Germany) and Berkeley (California). From 2013 to 2016 she worked as 
Project and Institute Manager with Prof Stephan Grüninger at the Center for Business 
Compliance & Integrity (CBCI) and the Konstanz Institute of Corporate Governance 
(KICG) in the area of Governance, Compliance & Integrity Management. 
  
			
*  This article is a revised and extended version of the German article “So geht das nicht – Compliance muss neu 
gedacht werden: Sechs Thesen für mehr Ernsthaftigkeit und Glaubwürdigkeit im Compliance-Management” 
by Stephan Grüninger which was published in Compliance Manager 1/2016. 
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ABSTRACT 
In the past Compliance Management has often failed, the Volkswagen emissions scandal 
just being one prominent example. Not everything has to be reinvented, and not every-
thing that companies have done in the past regarding Compliance is wrong. But it is 
about time to think Compliance in new ways. What does “Compliance Management 2.0” 
really depend on? The following article aims at laying out the cornerstones for enduring 
effective Compliance which amongst others comprises sincerity and credibility and a mor-
al foundation. Furthermore, the commitment and role model behavior of top managers 
and the training of line managers are crucial for the effectiveness of any Compliance 
Management System (CMS). Ultimately, for Compliance to function efficiently the ef-
forts must be adequate for the respective company and realistic regarding the achievable 
goals.
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I. INTRODUCTION: COMPLIANCE 1.0 DID NOT WORK UND CANNOT 
WORK 
 
Several past and recent real-life cases illustrate that non-Compliance can often not be 
prevented despite the existence of professional wide-spread corporate Compliance pro-
grams in the respective organizations. Already the textbook-case number one regarding 
bad corporate governance and corporate ethics, Enron, which was uncovered in October 
2001 is a prime example for excessive accounting fraud. It exemplifies that common 
Compliance programs do not seem to be able to prevent misbehavior in and by compa-
nies: „Enron had an extensive and award-winning code of ethics and corporate govern-
ance structure. […] The problem was failure to follow these policies and to develop an 
ethical, law-Compliance culture within the company.”1 
 
A not less startling case is the Siemens corruption scandal. It was uncovered in Decem-
ber 2006 and resulted in about € 1.3 billion of paid bribe money, until today an estimat-
ed financial damage of € 3 billion for fines and penalties as well as fees for consultants 
and lawyers and further costs for the internal investigation. This does not even include 
the so called “management attention”, that is the costs for the time of managers and 
employees invested in interrogations, in revising the Compliance system (Compliance 
remediation) and applying it to their daily work. “When I started working at Siemens, I 
analyzed the existing Compliance structure at first. In fact all relevant rules were existent 
on the enterprise level, but they were not broken down sufficiently in the operational 
areas”, said Dr. Andreas Pohlmann at the beginning of 2008 at a conference – more 
than one year after uncovering the until then biggest (known) corruption scandal in the 
economic history. “The ethics rules lay in the drawer, Compliance was a lip service.” 
 
Not least Volkswagen (VW) must be mentioned as the company did already have to deal 
with a veritable corruption case in 2005 and the following years, besides the recently 
uncovered emissions scandal. As is known, the issue at that time was that work council 
members had received illegal benefits which included luxury travels and services from 
prostitutes as well as illegitimate bonuses to the chairman of the work council which had 
been authorized by the chief human resources officer and labor director (member of the 
executive board). The momentous decision in the engine development at the headquar-
ters of the company in Wolfsburg was made just at the same time. This then led to the 
so called “Volkswagen emissions scandal” ten years later. The implemented Compliance 
structures and measures following the scandal in 2005 were apparently not of a kind that 
they could prevent committing offenses of environmental laws respectively uncover this 
misbehavior which is now shaking to the very foundations of VW. Instead in 2013 VW 
was still listed as a leading company regarding the completeness of their emission state-			
1  FREDERICK D LIPMAN & L. KEITH LIPMAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEST PRACTICES – STRATEGIES 
FOR PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 198 (2006). 
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ments and their climate protection efforts.2 So far the VW case is not even slightly clari-
fied, also not what the failure of the CMS or the Compliance organisation exactly was. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that here too there existed a Compliance system that didn’t 
work. According to reports voices that laws were broken were numerously raised, but 
they didn’t get through to the Chief Compliance Officer or the management board. Or 
did they? 
 
Anyway, all three cases show more than clearly that companies can get into difficult 
situations when outdated Compliance 1.0-structures3 are in place. Enron had imple-
mented a code of conduct and Compliance-structures that were even award-winning, 
Siemens too had “all necessary Compliance rules” (which is not self-evident at the turn 
of the millennium) and probably one of the best CMS of big industry in Germany. And 
in a phase of setting up Compliance structures after a veritable Compliance crisis in 2005 
the Volkswagen group even managed to provide for the conditions that led to the VW 
emissions scandal one decade later – this can be called “maximum credible Compliance 
accident” without exaggeration. 
 
One could have also chosen ThyssenKrupp (corruption and cartels scandal), Deutsche 
Bank (money laundering, Libor/Euribor manipulation, fraud in the business of mort-
gage loans, violation against sanctions etc.) or HSBC (money laundering, assistance in 
tax evasion etc.) and many more companies as examples. They all have in common that 
the misbehavior was mostly “systematic misbehavior”. But this is exactly what Compli-
ance systems should make impossible. This also makes clear that Compliance Manage-
ment Systems will never be designed in a way that every single case can be prevented or 
uncovered, but there definitely are ways to foster the effectiveness of Compliance. These 
aim at establishing sincere and credible corporate Compliance efforts which are better 
suited to prevent systematic misbehavior than the old Compliance 1.0 systems. 
 
II. CORNERSTONES FOR ENDURING EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE 
 
A. Sincerity and Credibility 
 
Compliance 1.0 systems did not work in many cases in the past, i.e. systematic misbehav-
ior couldn’t be prevented respectively revealed. So far, so bad. But why did or rather 
why do Compliance systems not function so often in practice? The reasons obviously 
vary from case to case. Yet the negative empirical indications suggest a lack of sincerity 			
2
  Carbon Disclosure Project: Global 500 Climate Change Report 8 (2013) 
(https://www.cdp.net/cdpresults/cdp-global-500-climate-change-report-2013.pdf). 
3  For the difference between „Compliance 1.0“ and „Compliance 2.0“ also see an interview with Donna 
Boehme, US-Expertin zu Dieselgate: Compliance bei VW ist veraltet, JUVE Verlag für juristische Infor-
mation GmbH (Oct. 26 2015), http://www.juve.de/nachrichten/namenundnachrichten/2015/10/us-
expertin-zu-dieselgate-Compliance-bei-vw-ist-veraltet. 
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and credibility as a cause for the failure of Compliance Management. Both factors, sin-
cerity and credibility, are – as is shown – connected and depend on each other. 
The term sincerity refers to an attitude, a disposition with which something is done. 
Sincerity is threatened by carelessness, superficialness and occasionally also by dilettan-
tism. If one is “sincere”, then for the area of Compliance Management this certainly 
means that measures are only chosen in such a manner that the goal aimed at – the pre-
vention of systematic misbehavior (plus revealing and stopping individual violations) – 
can potentially be reached. Technically spoken this concerns the appropriateness and 
functional effectiveness of Compliance systems. Whether Compliance measures are 
accepted, implemented or followed, whether one has trust in them or not, depends on 
whether they are being seen as credible. The spectrum of stakeholders who do or don’t 
assign credibility can reach from the own employees (Compliance with a guideline or a 
business process), over the auditors that examine the CMS as well as customers and 
business partners up to government agencies (e. g. public prosecution department). If 
credibility is not transported, stakeholders might get the impression that the Compli-
ance rules and measures are hypocritical, that the company is just pretending its sincerity 
regarding Compliance. 
 
The consciously ineffective design of a CMS by the management is just one possibility 
which presupposes sound knowledge of the “criteria of sincerity” on the part of the 
decision-makers (management board). After all it is possible that this knowledge is not 
present or is incomplete – the wrong decisions regarding the design of the CMS are 
made in good faith in their effective implementation. If one thus delimits the “scope of 
failure” in this still young management topic, then, at one end, it is conceivable that a 
management board knows exactly what the Compliance risks are and how to mitigate 
them, but makes decisions concerning the CMS that guarantee its failure. Or – that 
would be the other end of the scope – an ethically motivated, but bad informed man-
agement board makes similarly inapplicable decisions that likewise result in failure of the 
CMS. Motives and competences, hence wanting and knowing how, play a crucial role 
here and are not only imaginable, but probably also empirically existent in every possible 
mix ratio. 
 
A well designed, thus sincerely implemented and therefore credible CMS focuses on 
promoting the motivation for ethical and legal behavior while at the same time training 
the competences of the organization and its members. The realization of workshops 
with managers on the topic of “Compliance & Integrity”, in which ethical or Compli-
ance-oriented conflicts or dilemmas are integrated, is essential for enabling decision-
makers to handle such conflicts. The training should be designed in a way that partici-
pants would have to work on real-life cases for which possible solution strategies have to 
be found and presented. The discussion of such cases should concentrate less on con-
crete solutions but focus more on sharpening the attention for moral topics in business 
and training the decision-making process. The individual’s capacity to balance argu-
ments and reasons and judge in appropriate and morally sound ways should be 
strengthened, also by learning how to integrate different points of view on a topic. In 
this context Werhane and Moriarty speak of moral imagination which is needed for 
creatively solving such cases and should be fostered in business: „Moral imagination 
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enables managers to recognize a set of options that may not be obvious from within the 
overarching organizational framework; evaluate these options from a moral point of 
view; and actualize them.”4 Such competences should be trained in regular workshops, 
but of course also by good leadership. 
 
In daily business, relevant information concerning compliant behavior is often – con-
sciously or unconsciously – overlooked, especially if it serves the interests of the respec-
tive person to stay ignorant about certain facts. Such “motivated blindness”5 can be 
prevented when leaders consciously use moral language and speak of fairness or honesty 
in business decisions which stimulates ethical reflection of the situation.6 The strength-
ening of ethically sound principles and decision-making frameworks is especially im-
portant since research has shown that non-compliant behavior is very often coupled 
with neutralizing strategies on part of the agent which aim at justifying a certain illegiti-
mate or illegal behavior.7 In the corporate context such neutralizing techniques such as 
pointing to a higher authority or to more valuable goals in order to legitimize the own 
misbehavior is especially dangerous if such a rationale is adopted collectively in a de-
partment or the whole company.8 Compliance workshops where the problem of neu-
tralizing strategies is discussed by using cases taken from the working context of the 
personnel to be trained can help destabilize such mindsets and rationales.9 Ultimately, 
this is a major leadership task which has to be supported by corporate culture in general 
in order to lead to the desired results. 
 
The positive effect of such Compliance trainings is, on the one hand, that it enhances 
the competences of ethical-normative reflection and sound decision-making in conflict 
situations. On the other hand, it “forces” managers to position themselves (in the best 
case up to the management board and the supervisory board). The managers have to 
“put their cards on the table” and thereby automatically reveal their true motivation; if 
they cheat and just pretend their integrity in the training situation, they will be exposed 
as “noncredible” in foreseeable time and lose their authority as leaders. Of course, such 
trainings can ultimately only be successful if the strategies and principles to deal with 
ethically challenging situations are systematically integrated into daily business. As Paine 
states in her book Value Shift: “Validation occurs through practice and over time as the 			
4  PATRICIA H. WERHANE & BRIAN MORIARTY, MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT DECISION 
MAKING 3 (2011). 
5  Max H. Bazerman & Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Ethical Breakdowns. Good people often let bad things happen. 
Why?, April, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 59, 61 (2011). 
6  LINDA K. TREVIÑO & KATHERINE A. NELSON, MANAGING BUSINESS ETHICS – STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT 
HOW TO DO IT RIGHT 101 (1999). 
7  This phenomenon can be traced back to Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance; LEON FESTINGER, A 
THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). 
8  Hendrik Schneider, Cognitive Dissonance As A Prevention Strategy – Considerations on the Prospects of 
Neutralizing the Techniques of Neutralization, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL 18, 29 (Vol.3 No. 2 2017). 
9  Ibid, 206. 
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principle is seen to be an integral and operative force in the organization’s activities.”10 
 
A further example for fostering sincerity and credibility of the Compliance endeavors is 
the use of an “Integrity Barometer” for measuring the state and quality of the imple-
mentation of a CMS and the ethical climate in a company. It should include questions 
on the role model behavior of managers, the credibility of the management board re-
garding Compliance activities etc. Such a measuring tool shall not be misunderstood as 
an exact method for objectively detecting the state of a company concerning Compli-
ance at a certain point in time, but as a dynamic technique that shows trends and devel-
opments and gives indications to special problems and to methods of their resolution. 
An “Integrity Barometer” should focus on questions regarding the implemented man-
agement system and the corresponding behavior in the company (see fig. 1).11 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: „Integrity Barometer“ 
 
 
Already the courage of executive management to question managers and employees 
anonymously testifies their sincerity in this regard – provided that at least some knowl-
edgability on the part of the decision-makers is given and the posed questions are rele-
vant. After all one has to anticipate that the feedback will also illuminate critical points 
in the corporate and employee behavior and thus consequences have to be drawn. By 
professionally implementing an “Integrity Barometer” the company respectively the 
management board communicates that one is sincerely striving towards a successful 
Compliance Management. This signalized sincerity produces credibility on the part of 
the stakeholders. Such a recursive relationship between sincerity and credibility also 
applies to a further important Compliance instrument, the whistleblower system. Com-
panies that commit themselves to implementing, communicating and monitoring such a 
system signal and actualize sincerity and receive credibility – because and insofar as they 
have to follow reports on grievances and uncover and stop possible misbehavior. A 
whistleblower system that is designed and implemented by every trick in the book takes 			
10
  LYNN S. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT – WHY COMPANIES MUST MERGE SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL IMPERATIVES 
TO ACHIEVE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 177 (2003). 
11  The Center for Business Compliance & Integrity (CBCI) has developed an approach for an “Integrity Ba-
rometer” in cooperation with COMFORMIS (a brand of digitalspirit GmbH). Also known is the so called 
“Integrity Thermometer” of Prof. Muel Kaptein. 
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the management board the possibility or at least makes it much more difficult to refuse 
knowledge of certain behaviors that could bring the company illegal advantages, like 
business contracts (e. g. by bribing end customers through sales agents) or higher profit 
margins (e. g. illegal price fixing of retailers). The management will more likely come to 
know such misbehavior that might provide the company with illegal benefits and there-
fore has to deal with it. 
 
The appointment of the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) may serve as a last example 
regarding its effects on credibility. Is a highly competent, in the company and from 
business partners respected and to some extent “powerful” person appointed and is she 
equipped with extensive authority and resources? Or is someone appointed as CCO for 
whom one could not find a suitable position for quite a while and who is considered as 
“harmless”? Is it someone who shall “form” Compliance at the fourth or fifth level in 
the organization and as a start has to request his journey for a “Compliance Check” of a 
business partner from his supervisor? Even if these questions describe extremes this does 
not change the fact that the appointment of the CCO is connected with the sincerity 
and credibility of Compliance Management in the above described manner: A weak 
CCO cannot manage an (intended) strong CMS. An (intended) weak Compliance 
Management doesn’t tolerate a strong CCO. By appointing a strong CCO the manage-
ment board signalizes that Compliance Management has priority and shall succeed. This 
signalized self-enforcement in turn creates credibility inwards (employees) and outwards 
(external stakeholders). The CCO should directly take care of a certain subset of all 
Compliance topics with regards to content (as far as possible the high-risk topics which 
in many companies will often be found in the areas of anti-bribery and corruption as 
well as anti-trust). Other Compliance topics will only be coordinated by him and possi-
bly consolidated in terms of reporting. Certainly some tasks, competences and responsi-
bilities of the CCO should be defined in written form. But it is more important that it is 
made clear that “Compliance” is an independent sphere of competence. A good lawyer 
is not automatically a good Compliance Manager. Also a non-lawyer can be a good 
Compliance Manager. Selecting the right person is supposedly one of the most signifi-
cant premises for successful Compliance 2.0. 
 
One can sum up that wherever the step to initiating self-enforcement in Compliance 
Management is dared, sincerity can be shown internally and externally and credibility is 
established. Wherever this step is avoided, affected stakeholders may interpret this as a 
sign of carelessness, superficialness, dilettantism and hypocrisy. 
 
If one accepts the mentioned Compliance measures as examples for certain “criteria of 
sincerity”12 and one takes a look at the company landscape, then one can assert that 
- high-quality Compliance workshops for managers with dilemma trainings are 
still an exception; instead one can find instructions on legislation and more or 
less successful web-based trainings; 			
12  High-quality empirical field studies regarding the mentioned “criteria of sincerity“ are desirable. 
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- appropriate, anonymous manager and employee surveys regarding Compliance 
& Integrity are only conducted in very few cases; 
- anonymous whistleblower systems in general are not widespread so far and, if 
they are installed, are implemented insufficiently (especially regarding commu-
nication, training and motivation of relevant stakeholders to use them); 
- the position of the CCO is not firmly integrated into the corporate structure. 
Everything can be found, from the management board to some subordinated 
middle management position. Corporate flexibility in view of the necessity (e. 
g. because of uncovered systematic misbehavior), the corporate structure and 
size, the general risk exposure and internationality is certainly important and 
correct. But without a respected person with authority Compliance cannot be 
successful. 
 
B. Moral Foundation of Compliance 
 
“Compliance“ refers to conformity with a rule. The verb “to comply [with]” means 
amongst others “following”, “adhering to sth.”, “acting on sth.”. Hence, Compliance 
constitutes a restriction and always has to become concrete on the norm which shall be 
acted upon. The desired behavior is mainly triggered by external pressure. The central 
question is which behavior can (still) be accepted or is allowed. Posing this question is 
certainly relevant for Compliance Management, but it is not sufficient for a CMS to 
function effectively and reliable. Instead, a moral foundation is needed, for example by 
striving for integrity which refers to the consistency of values and principles, motivation 
and action.13 Integrity is tightly connected to honesty and truthfulness and can be un-
derstood as the contrary to hypocrisy. It can individually be considered as a “virtue of 
inner consistency” since the action of the agent has to be consistent with her corre-
sponding inner attitude. In the context of ethics integrity is regarded as an independent 
moral quality which is defined as acting according to morally sound values and princi-
ples out of inner conviction.14 The right behavior is governed by recognizing that it is 
morally right and because the agent is intrinsically motivated to acting correctly, she 
cannot avoid acting accordingly. She also asks what is permissible, but especially which 
behavior is (morally) right. On the basis of this reflection of her behavior she can give 
good reasons as to why it is right to act this way. Justice and law are also important refer-
ences for questions of integrity, but not the only ones. In the corporate context integrity 
rather means that a company commits itself consciously not only to legal, but also to 
moral behavior. This is realized by consistently acting on morally sound corporate val-
ues and principles in daily business. 
 
This can be illustrated with one example: Bribing in order to win a contract in foreign 
business is prosecuted criminally since quite a while. If one adds to this the – in various 			
13  See e. g. DAVID BAUMAN, INTEGRITY, IDENTITY, AND WHY MORAL EXEMPLARS DO WHAT IS RIGHT 14 
(2011). 
14  Cf. RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, COMPETING WITH INTEGRITY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 6 (1993).  
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countries certainly different – investigative pressure, there is sufficient pressure that 
companies and their employees comply with anti-bribery and corruption rules. In addi-
tion, the intrinsically motivated and reflected person will understand and acknowledge 
that bribery and corruption undermines the (ethically legitimated) principle of competi-
tion by which the most productive respectively the cheapest will receive a contract. Cor-
ruption hence prevents innovation and undermines the development of the rule of law 
and democracy especially in developing and emerging nations. These are all good reasons 
to understand that corruption is bad. By this insight (some) people are intrinsically mo-
tivated to act in a way that leads to the “right behavior” even in an environment of weak 
law enforcement, thus continuous effectiveness can be attained. Compliance properly 
understood as responsible behavior cannot be achieved without a moral foundation of 
the Compliance rules and measures – also because otherwise every inaccuracy of a Com-
pliance rule and every gap in the legal framework will probably lead to misbehavior. 
 
C. Seizure of results of company-internal investigations 
 
It is crucial to understand that the management board should regularly make strategic 
and operational decisions which prove the commitment to Compliance and Integrity. 
The management board and the (top) managers should thus be informed and compe-
tent on the topic of Compliance and Integrity. They should know the fundamental 
Compliance risks in the regions, business divisions and business processes. It is their 
responsibility to personally inform themselves in conversation with their corresponding 
managers about the implementation of the CMS and possible conflict situations or 
ethical dilemmas. The significant Compliance risks and the commitment to Compliance 
must be addressed regularly inside and outside the company by the management board 
and the (top) managers (town hall meetings, management meetings, discussions with 
customers, conferences etc.). An essential condition is that the existing incentives in the 
company in no case hinder following Compliance rules or even make exactly that impos-
sible. Ensuring this is a management task. For (top) managers it should be checked 
whether reasonable goals regarding Compliance Management can be found (implemen-
tation of the CMS in the own sphere of responsibility, handling revealed cases, bottom-
up feedback regarding behavior, values, Compliance commitment). These could be 
integrated in an existing regular target agreement where appropriate. Misbehavior must 
be sanctioned according to its severity (financial damage, reputational harm, criminal 
penalties etc.) irrespective of the person concerned. Summed up, the much quoted 
“tone from the top” is important, but the “tone at the top” is even more important. 
 
Distinctive incentives to reward Compliance to the law are not required, but appreciat-
ing especially moral behavior in the company can be endorsed. This could comprise 
financial and non-financial benefits but should especially include visible acknowledg-
ment of the model behavior in order to encourage imitation and reinforce ethical behav-
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 2   2017 
STEPHAN GRÜNINGER & LISA SCHÖTTL  |  RETHINKING COMPLIANCE – ESSENTIAL CORNER-STONES FOR MORE  
EFFECTIVENESS IN COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
PAGE  14 
ior.15 In the same way as it is important to increase the costs for non-Compliance by 
implementing sanctions it is advisable to lower the individual costs for acting compliant 
and (morally) right by promoting such decisions, e. g. with a Compliance Scorecard 
which is taken into account for premiums and promotions.16 
 
Albeit the right behavior of top managers is an essential condition for successful Com-
pliance, implementation of Compliance in the company is carried out by line managers, 
that is the normal hierarchy is obtained. Thus, every manager must ensure Compliance 
in his own range of command. The Compliance function (the CCO) should support 
line management in implementing the CMS in daily business and has a consulting role 
regarding business decisions and transactions (possibly together with further positions, 
e. g. the legal department). This also points out that Compliance understood like that 
can only function if line managers (purchasing, sales, production, R&D etc.) are thor-
oughly trained. As outlined above these trainings have to include practicing ethical deci-
sion-making. Then managers will be able to reach independent, well-informed decisions 
in conflict situations. Furthermore, then they can pass on their knowledge and give ori-
entation. They will be enabled to implement the CMS in their sphere of responsibility, 
fill it with life and make it a part of business processes. Only those who are able to speak 
will speak. That means managers trained in such a way will be able to contribute much 
more to fostering the much-evoked “speak-up culture”. This mechanism can be 
strengthened further when top managers (at least the management board, possibly also 
the supervisory board) participate in such trainings as well and position themselves clear-
ly to business-based dilemmas. 
 
III. CMS IMPLEMNENTATION GUIDANCE 
 
The question of the effectiveness of a CMS17 is much discussed. An armada of require-
ments and standards has been developed in the past years, as e. g. ISO 19600 and IDW 
PS 980 (for an incomplete listing see fig. 2). But in most cases the standards do not ad-
dress the specific conditions of companies and the context they act in when giving sug-
gestions on how a CMS should be implemented. 
 
			
15
  Cf. Muel Kaptein, Understanding Unethical Behavior by Unraveling Ethical Culture, 64, HUMAN RELA-
TIONS 843, 851 (2011). 
16
  Hendrik Schneider, Cognitive Dissonance As A Prevention Strategy – Considerations on the Prospects of 
Neutralizing the Techniques of Neutralization, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL 18, 32 (Vol.3 No. 2 
2017). 
17  See Stephan Grüninger & Maximilian Jantz, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Prüfung von Compliance-
Management-Systemen – Gestaltung interner oder externer Wirksamkeits und Umsetzungsprüfungen, ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 131 (2013). 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 2   2017 
STEPHAN GRÜNINGER & LISA SCHÖTTL  |  RETHINKING COMPLIANCE – ESSENTIAL CORNER-STONES FOR MORE  
EFFECTIVENESS IN COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
PAGE  15 
 
Fig. 2: Requirements of CMS 
 
 
A project that aimed at addressing the specific questions companies of different size and 
structure have when implementing a Compliance Management System is the develop-
ment of the “KICG-Guidelines” which were released in 2014. These represent the first 
attempt to describe suggestions for the appropriateness of CMS for companies of differ-
ent levels of Compliance complexity (size, internationality, risk exposure) in detail.18 
Several stakeholder groups participated in this project (representatives of companies of 
different levels of Compliance complexity, lawyers, accountants/specialists in forensic 
services). In a follow-up project these project results are verified with members of judi-
cial authorities, scientists, representatives of NGOs etc. in order to achieve a higher de-
gree of reliability19 and thus an incentive, especially for medium-sized companies, to 
address the topic of Compliance and invest in prevention. It is likewise important to see 
that the KICG-Guidelines were developed to give suggestions for both design and eval-
uation of a CMS and do not intend to establish a new standard (contrary to the inten-
tion of e. g. ISO 19600). This project was so important and is mentioned here because 
the “CMS Best Practice Standard” established in very big companies (e. g. DAX 30) does 
not fit to medium-sized companies and would completely overburden them. A CMS is 
ultimately measured at its effectiveness – regardless of whether it is the CMS of a very 
big or a comparably small company. In view of the question of an “adequate design” 
			
18
  STEPHAN GRÜNINGER, MAXIMILIAN JANTZ, CHRISTINE SCHWEIKERT & ROLAND STEINMEYER, EMP-
FEHLUNGEN FÜR DIE AUSGESTALTUNG UND BEURTEILUNG VON COMPLIANCE-MANAGEMENT-
SYSTEMEN (Konstanz Institut für Corporate Governance 2014); STEPHAN GRÜNINGER ET AL., KICG 
COMPLIANCE ESSENTIALS (Konstanz Institut für Corporate Governance 2017). 
19  Reliability regarding the (official) expectations about the appropriateness of corporate Compliance measures. 
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there exist in fact major differences as the project results show.20 
 
In spite of or even because of the many standards and recommendations it is probably 
necessary that legislators in Germany and all over Europe define general requirements of 
CMS and incorporate them into positive law. They should specify concisely what is 
expected from companies and other organizations regarding Compliance. A specifica-
tion of the OWiG21, as proposed from different sides22, would be a viable path for Ger-
many. Guidelines such as the ones from KICG or standards like the IDW PS 980 or ISO 
19600 could serve as references for the implementation.  
 
Furthermore, it is essential for companies and can only be decided there that the func-
tioning of CMS measures is ensured in an efficient, that means also cost-efficient, man-
ner. The approach “Compliance as a line function” helps here because it avoids excessive 
installing of resources in the central Compliance function and prefers a decentral organi-
zation instead. For measures in the area of Compliance to work it is important to achieve 
acceptance. Also for this purpose the manager workshops outlined before are an appro-
priate approach. The Compliance function has the task to call attention to risks and 
mitigate these together with line management. But independent controls and process 
analysis too are important to identify gaps and weaknesses in the implementation of the 
CMS. As with other central topics in the company it should not only rely on the under-
standing of the managers and trust in their personal integrity and competences, but 
should also complement these as necessary by (external) professional expertise in order 
to guarantee the functioning of the CMS. 
 
Compliance should be limited regarding content and with respect to business relation-
ships. This means that a company pays attention to not promising anything in the code 
of conduct or other normative texts it cannot hold respectively whose Compliance can-
not be controlled. In some code of conduct one can find the statement that “all UN 
conventions are being followed” which naturally sounds good – at least nobody would 
want to claim the opposite. But then one should also precisely know to content of all 
UN conventions. By all means adhering to human rights in the value chain is anything 
but trivial for globally operating companies. In many countries human rights are not 
respected at all, violations have an incidence rate of one. One may say that one respects 
human rights wherever it is in the sphere of influence of the company, but one should 
also point to the problems and to the limits of the scope of responsibility. In this con-
			
20  See Anforderungen an ein effektives Compliance-Management, Konstanz Institut für Corporate Governance 
– KICG (Aug.2, 2017), http://www.htwg-konstanz.de/Compliance-Pflichten.6958.0.html. 
21  Regulatory Offences Act (German: Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz) 
22  See Bundesverband der Unternehmensjuristen e. V, Gesetzgebungsvorschlag für eine Änderung der §§ 30, 130 
des Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetzes (OWiG), Frankfurt am Main, 2014; Deutschen Instituts für Compliance – 
DICO e.V, Compliance-Anreiz-Gesetz. Ein Vorschlag für den Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Schaffung von An-
reizen für Compliance-Maßnahmen in Betrieben und Unternehmen, Berlin, 2014. 
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text, the widely accepted UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights23 
might serve as guidance. They oblige states to protect human rights („State Duty to 
Protect“) and ascribe companies a responsibility to respect human rights („Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect“) which is accompanied by “due diligence”. By consciously 
delimiting and forming the own sphere of responsibility it will become evident whether 
Compliance is designed sincerely and credibly – or whether the diverse stakeholder de-
mands are adopted without further thought and reflection about how to meet them. 
Also regarding the prevention of bribery and corruption it should be stated more clearly 
where the boundaries of Compliance Management in sales and distribution lie. No mat-
ter how perfectly a business partner due diligence is managed, a residual risk that the 
agent bribes the end customer will remain. As of today nobody can tell a company 
which due diligence standard is adequate for exculpating an incident. Thus, it is even 
more important that companies clarify what they do and where they see the limits of a 
thorough due diligence process, also financially. 
 
The Compliance department and especially the CCO should be established as „trusted 
advisors” who offer a clear additional benefit to the operational business units. This 
benefit basically consists in locally developing and maintaining the competence of all 
business units to approach generally risky business with the highest possible degree of 
legal security and integrity. This naturally includes that some business dealings cannot 
be done. A Compliance department which merely sets and communicates rules, but 
runs off when conflicts arise, will not survive in the long run or will lose itself in insignif-
icance. This also points out that Compliance Management should focus on “top risks”. 
Regarding Compliance companies like to deal with the topic of “gifts and hospitality”. 
As interesting as this may be, the real problems lie somewhere else: bribing to acquire 
business contracts, offenses of environmental law, cartels, avoiding export sanctions, 
product liability etc. – those are topics that companies have to work on, in fact world-
wide, in order to have an effective CMS. The ultimately relevant Compliance risks of a 
company can only be mitigated if a CMS can give orientation on the topics mentioned. 
Only then potentially existence-threatening Compliance breaches might be prevented. 
Only then Compliance is really serving business. 
 
 
			
23
  See United Nations Human Rights – Office of the high Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusiness 
HR_EN.pdf. 
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ABSTRACT 
In the light of Michael Walters’s declarations on the relationship of the perpetrator to the 
offense based on the theory of techniques of neutralization the article sets its sights on the 
structuring of in-house compliance programs in order to ensure internally prevention 
measures. In doing so the author states that those compliance programs should primarily 
rely on creating an atmosphere in which common neutralization strategies are not accept-
ed. In order to be successful the companies need in-depth programs, which are goal-
oriented. But there has to be a company interest in compliance as well. The “tone from 
the top” plays an important role when it comes to neutralization strategies. The essay 
shows the meaning of techniques of neutralization within the area of applied economic 
criminology.
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I. NEUTRALIZATION TECHNIQUES AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE — THE 
APPROACH OF MICHAEL WALTER 
 
In the commemorative publication for Hans-Dieter Schwind, Michael Walter explained 
and exemplified, in a noteworthy approach, the relationship of the perpetrator to the 
offense based on the theory of techniques of neutralization.1 An innovative, key concept 
that Walter develops in the article lies in linking the well-known “techniques of neutrali-
zation” of Sykes & Matza2 with the theory of cognitive dissonance of Leon Festinger. 
With impressive formulations and based on content analyses of specific works of crea-
tive literature and autobiographies of terrorists, Walter demonstrates that criminal of-
fenses beyond a petty level trigger in the perpetrator an “internal pressure for justifica-
tion” (p. 1165). Neutralization techniques then allow him to once again “smooth out” 
the “inner disturbance” inside himself and “accordingly remake and stabilize himself” 
(p. 1157). These techniques shield one from the “voices of the conscience or the negative 
judgments of others” (p. 1158), and “sedate” the “internal monitoring of norms” (p. 
1158). 
 
Within the framework of an “interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenon of neutral-
ization” (p. 1159 ff.), Walter then refers to the psychological basic assumption of a need 
for harmony in humans that strives for “normative consonance” (p. 1161) and that does 
not tolerate “cognitively experienced conflicts” very well. Against this backdrop, and in 
line with Leon Festinger, he describes as cognitive dissonance the “bad feelings” of the 
offender (p. 1161) that precede the techniques of neutralization.3 Consequently, tech-
niques of neutralization represent a certain group of possible strategies to reduce disso-
nance, which are characterized by assimilating new cognitive elements. Walter uses the 
example of a smoker to elucidate this thought process. If the smoker categorizes the 
habit of smoking as dangerous and damaging to health, this triggers cognitive disso-
nance. This can be reduced either by changing individual thoughts (for example, “I do 
not smoke frequently and only few cigarettes”) or the recourse to new cognitive ele-
ments (“Due to my excellent physical condition, I belong to the group that will reach a 
very old age despite smoking”, p. 1161). There is also a new assimilation of cognitive ele-
ments in the techniques of neutralization described by Sykes & Matza. If, for instance, 
cognitive dissonance arises by virtue of the offender’s friction with certain conformity 
values to which he is “in principle” obligated, the neutralization strategy identified by 
			
1  Michael Walter, Wie kann ein Mensch so etwas tun? in Festschrift für Hans-Dieter Schwind 1155 ff. (Thomas 
Feltes & Christian Pfeiffer & Gernot Steinhilper, 2006). For the purpose of better readability, source refer-
ences from this article will only be cited by stating the page number. 
2  DAVID MATZA GRESHAM M. SYKES, TECHNIQUES OF NEUTRALIZATION: A THEORY OF DELINQUENCY, 
664 ff. (1957). 
3  Foundational: LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). 
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Sykes & Matza of “the appeal to higher loyalties”4 aids one in resolving the inner-psychic 
stress. Michael Walter identifies as an example the pledge of the former Federal Chancel-
lor Helmut Kohl, who refused to divulge the identity of the donors in the so-called 
CDU donations scandal. Kohl justified this violation of a legal duty to himself and to-
wards third parties thereby in that he asserted he had assured the donors of absolute 
confidentiality: “But ladies and gentlemen, I have given my word to the donors [...] and 
I will keep to my word, and that is very important for me”5 Walter aptly summarizes the 
consciousness processes underlying such cognitions and statements as follows (interim 
assessment on p. 1162): 
 
“A person seeks, as emerges from Festinger’s dissonance theory, ways to get 
around these disharmonies. The neutralization mechanisms contain appropri-
ate new cognitive aspects that possess a mediating effect, assuage living in the 
conflict and at the same time improve one’s external performance.” 
 
Michael Walter’s work involves the first publication in which the significance of the 
techniques of neutralization are psychologically reconstructed based on the theory of 
cognitive dissonance.6 The present paper ties into the question also posed by him in the 
commemorative publication for Hans-Dieter Schwind from 2006 of the practical appli-
cation for criminological theories and in particular, the concepts of neutralization and 
cognitive dissonance. The objective is to further develop the integration of both theoret-
ical constructs7 and to illustrate the “capacity” (p. 1155) of the insights attained for pre-			
4  DAVID MATZA GRESHAM M. SYKES, TECHNIQUES OF NEUTRALIZATION: A THEORY OF DELINQUENCY, 
669 (1957). 
5  Helmut Kohl, address at the New Year's reception of the Bremen CDU, broadcast on television (Jan. 21, 
2000), (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4gpYZftwlMw). 
6  Walter’s reasoning was addressed in the dissertation of Laura Claassen (LAURA CLASSEN, NEUTRALISIER-
UNGSTECHNIKEN UND KOGNITIVE DISSONANZ – EIN BEITRAG ZUR PRÄVENTION VON 
WIRTSCHAFTSKRIMINALITÄT (2013)) which was supervised by the author of this paper. 
7  In so doing it is certainly debatable and (despite the subtitle of the work by Sykes & Matza) as yet unclear 
whether the neutralization techniques are a criminological theory at all. In German criminology, they are 
mostly featured without detailed explanation in the theories (MICHAEL BOCK, KRIMINOLOGIE, 54f. (3rd 
ed., 2007); ULRICH EISENBERG, KRIMINOLOGIE, 21f. (6th ed., 2005); HANS GÖPPINGER, KRIMINOLOGIE, 
150 (6th ed., 2008); GÜNTHER KAISER & HEINZ SCHÖCH, KRIMINOLOGIE, JUGENDSTRAFRECHT, STRAF-
VOLLZUG, 11 (7th ed., 2010); KARL-LUDWIG KUNZ, KRIMINOLOGIE, 115 (6th ed., 2011); Klaus Lüderssen, 
Kriminologie: Eine Einführung in die Probleme, 139 (1st ed., 1984); BERND-DIETER MEIER, KRIMINOLOGIE, 
59ff. (4th ed., 2010); ARMAND MERGEN, DIE KRIMINOLOGIE, EINE SYSTEMATISCHE DARSTELLUNG, 123 
(3rd ed., 1995); FRANK NEUBACHER, KRIMINOLOGIE, 85 (1st ed., 2011); HANS JOACHIM SCHNEIDER, KRI-
MINOLOGIE, 516ff. (1st ed., 1987), p. 516ff.). Only Schwind situates the neutralization techniques in victimo-
logy (HANS-DIETER SCHWIND, KRIMINOLOGIE: EINE PRAXISORIETIERTE EINFÜHRUNG MIT BEISPIELEN, 
406f. (21st ed., 2011)). In addition, reference is made to neutralization techniques in integration models (thus, 
already DAVID MATZA, DELIQUENCY AND DRIFT, 184 (1st ed., 1964); also, James Coleman, Toward an inte-
grated Theory of White-Collar Crime, 2, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 93, 406 (Sep., 1987); Hendrik 
Schneider, Das Leipziger Verlaufsmodell wirtschaftskriminellen Handelns, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
STRAFRECHT 555ff. (2007), ibid. 135 ff. (2008), ibid. 4 ff. (2009)). Other authors, in particular Robert Ag-
new, Neutralizing the Impact of Crime, 12, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOUR 221, 227ff. (1985), p. 227ff. 
make reference to specific neutralization strategies of the victims of crime, which have the function of reduc-
ing the anxiety of further victimization (Denial of Injury, Denial of Vulnerability, Belief in a Just World). If 	
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vention, in particular for the prevention of economic crimes. 
II. CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES BETWEEN THE TECHNIQUES OF 
NEUTRALIZATION OF SYKES & MATZA AND FESTINGER’S THEORY OF 
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
 
A. Central arguments of both approaches 
 
As an initial matter, it is notable that both approaches were developed at the same time 
without the authors recognizably taking notice or influencing one another.8 Festinger’s 
theory was published for the first time in 1957. At that time, the author taught psychol-
ogy at Stanford University in California. In the same year, the article of Sykes & Matza 
was published, which is apparently inspired by an earlier work (not utilized by Festing-
er) of the criminologist Cressey. 
 
Cressey, a student of Sutherland, had already made reference to—in the monograph 
published in 1953 “Other People’s Money” in connection with a qualitative investigation 
of the causes and manifestations of embezzlement the significance of so-called “rational-
izations”9 or “vocabularies of adjustment”10 that allow perpetrators to justify to them-
selves an abuse of the trust placed in them by their subsequent victims. In Cressey’s 
view, the exonerating argumentation strategies (“I was only borrowing the money”, “I 
did what is ordinary business”) already intervene prior to committing the act11 and are an 
indicator for an effort to belong in a world in which criminality is rejected. They conse-
quently help the perpetrator in the process of making the unlawful conduct compatible 
with the self-image of a trustworthy person. 
 			
one (with Sykes & Matza) assumes that neutralization techniques are learned, this suggests that the theory of 
neutralization techniques are to be filed in the category of learning theories. 
8  To date, there has been no transdisciplinary analysis of both approaches, although both theories were broad-
ly received in their respective disciplines. LAURA CLASSEN, NEUTRALISIERUNGSTECHNIKEN UND KOGNI-
TIVE DISSONANZ – EIN BEITRAG ZUR PRÄVENTION VON WIRTSCHAFTSKRIMINALITÄT (2013) reports, 
with reference to Shadd Maruna & Heith Copes, What Have we Learned from five Decades of Neutraliza-
tion Resaerch?, 32 , CRIME AND JUSTICE, 700 (2005)works of international criminology in which the theory 
of neutralization strategies is cited. Furthermore, there is an array of studies on the neutralization techniques 
that have a qualitative and quantitative research design. In the field of psychology, the Theory of Cognitive 
Dissonance is counted among the pioneering efforts of so-called social psychology, cf. on this, comprehen-
sively, LAURA CLASSEN, NEUTRALISIERUNGSTECHNIKEN UND KOGNITIVE DISSONANZ – EINBEITRAG 
ZUR PRÄVENTION VON WIRTSCHAFTSKRIMINALITÄT (2013). 
9  DONALD RAY CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EMBEZ-
ZLEMENT, 34 (1953). 
10  DONALD RAY CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EMBEZ-
ZLEMENT, 93 ff. (1953). 
11
  DONALD RAY CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EMBEZ-
ZLEMENT, 94 (1953): “In the cases of trust violation encountered significant rationalizations were always pre-
sent before the criminal act took place, and in fact, after the act had taken place the rationalization often was 
abandoned.” 
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In Sykes' & Matza’s much shorter treatment, the “rationalizations” are called “tech-
niques of neutralization”12 for the first time, although they also speak of rationalizations 
or justifications without a recognizable difference in terms of their content. The differ-
ences between both approaches are minimal. Both Cressey and also Sykes & Matza 
summarize arguments under the respectively applied umbrella terms with which the 
citizen obligated to comply with the law can allow himself a violation of the norm and 
avert injury to his self-image. However, in this respect Sykes & Matza make it clear that 
the techniques of neutralization can occur both before and also after committing the 
offense. Accordingly, they clear the path into criminality (“they precede deviant behav-
ior and make deviant behavior possible”13) and in addition, have the function of excus-
ing the crime towards oneself and others after the fact14 (“protecting the individual from 
self-blame and the blame of others after the act”15). 
 
For Festinger it is not a question of explaining delinquency or conformity, but rather in 
general, the consonance or dissonance of two cognitions. He conceives under the term 
cognitions, “any knowledge, opinion or belief about the environment, oneself or one’s 
own behavior”.16 Multiple cognitions can be related to one another, but it is not re-
quired. Consistent cognitions lead to consonance; inconsistent cognitions produce dis-
sonance. Festinger describes dissonance as “psychological discomfort”17 that provokes a 
desire in the individual, with the goal of reducing this, to return to a consonant relation-
ship in cognitions. Dissonant cognitions develop especially in decision situations,18 be-
cause weighing between two alternative courses of action always also entails the decision 
for one and against the other cognition. If the dissonance-triggering decision cannot be 
undone, the dissonance reduction strategies of modifying the attractiveness of the alter-
natives involved in the decision and/or creating a so-called “cognitive overlap” of both 			
12  DAVID MATZA GRESHAM M. SYKES, TECHNIQUES OF NEUTRALIZATION: A THEORY OF DELINQUENCY, 
667 (1957). 
13  DAVID MATZA GRESHAM M. SYKES, TECHNIQUES OF NEUTRALIZATION: A THEORY OF DELINQUENCY, 
666 (1957). 
14  On the problem of timing with regard to when the neutralization strategies step in, compare also Michael L. 
Benson, Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvment in White Collar Crime, 23, CRIMINOLOGY, 
583ff., 604 (1985), and Nicole Leeper Piquero & Stephen G. Tibbetts & Michael Blankenship, Examining the 
Role of Differential Association and Techniques of Neutralization in Explaining Corporate Crime, 26, DEVI-
ANT BEHAVIOR, 159ff. (2005) A criminal etiological theory can only then be derived from the theory of neu-
tralization techniques if these intervene prior to the offense, and therefore, cause (share in causing) the of-
fense, and/or pave the way into delinquency. In the theory of cognitive dissonance, Festinger (LEON 
FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE, 49 (1978)) assumes that dissonance arises after a deci-
sion, not necessarily initially after carrying out an action. According to another conception, one must distin-
guish between the final decision and the intermediate decisions that precede this. Already preliminary deci-
sions and their underlying assessment processes could allow for cognitive dissonance to emerge, cf. MARTIN 
IRLE & VOLKER MÖNTMANN, THEORIE DER KOGNITIVEN DISSONANZ, 317ff. (1978). 
15  DAVID MATZA GRESHAM M. SYKES, TECHNIQUES OF NEUTRALIZATION: A THEORY OF DELINQUENCY, 
666 (1957). 
16  LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE, 17 (1978). 
17  LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE, 16 (1978). 
18  LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE, 19 ff. (1978). 
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cognitions come into question. In the case of modifying the attractiveness of a course of 
action, the actor frequently draws upon new cognitions that assist him in increasing the 
attractiveness of the selected course of action, and reducing that of the alternative not 
selected. To be classified in this category of dissonance reduction strategies are, for ex-
ample, the neutralization strategies of “appeal to higher loyalties” and “rejection of penal 
provisions”.19 If the perpetrator invokes a value of greater significance (such as for exam-
ple, H. Kohl in the word of honor case), he highlights the importance and correctness of 
his conduct, and consequently, reduces the cognitive dissonance by increasing the attrac-
tiveness of the decision he made (in the word of honor case: non-disclosure of the names 
of the donors). A comparable strategy also exists if the offender argues that it would be 
appropriate to break the law because it was in any case flawed (example: “the law I broke 
was just ‘governmental intervention on the free market”; “It's just ‘that the government 
wastes the taxes collected’”20). From the perspective of the actor, who labels himself as 
an informed insider who is aware of the true laws of the market, it was accordingly only 
logical to not follow the law. 
 
Creating cognitive overlapping is involved if, through a measure of abstraction, as many 
commonalities as possible between both courses of action are sought. This is the case in 
so-called crisis criminality21 when the perpetrator justifies the violation of the law with 
the reasoning that he acted for the good, that is to say, for example, retained jobs or 
served the shareholders.22 This not only increases the attractiveness of the delinquent 
conduct (see above), but rather also pursues, (just as conformity with the law), a morally 
valuable, altruistic purpose from the perspective of the actor. 
 
Techniques of neutralization therefore apparently represent dissonance reduction strat-
egies within the meaning of Festinger's theory. They smooth the way into criminality, 
starting with the decision situation for or against the action, all the way through emo-
tional stabilization after the crime when it comes to justifying the action to oneself and 
others. The combination of both approaches not only facilitates criminology in a psy-
chological reconstruction of the importance of neutralization techniques, and therefore, 
contributes to a better understanding of this approach, but also opens up additional 			
19  James Coleman, Toward an integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime, 2, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOL-
OGY 93, 411 (Sep., 1987). 
20  Orly Turgeman-Goldschmidt, Between Hackers and White-Collar Crime Offenders, in Corporate Hacking 
and Technology-Driven Crime: Social Dynamics and Implications 28 (Thomas J. Holt & Bernadette H. 
Schell, 2011). 
21
  Cf. on this Hendrik Schneider & Dieter John, Der Wirtschaftsstraftäter in seinen sozialen Bezügen. Empiri-
sche Befunde und Konsequenzen für die Unternehmenspraxis, in Wirtschaftskriminalität 159 ff. (Britta Ban-
nenberg & Jörg-Martin Jehle, 1st ed. 2010) and HENDRIK SCHNEIDER, DER WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFTÄTER IN 
SEINEN SOZIALEN BEZÜGEN. AKTUELLE FORSCHUNGSERGEBNISSE UND KONSEQUENZEN FÜR DIE UN-
TERNEHMENSPRAXIS, 4 ff. (2009): In particular, techniques of neutralization could be demonstrated for the 
crisis offender type. 
22  Cf. on this Joseph Heath, Business Ethics and Moral Motivation: A Criminological Perspective, 83, JOURNAL 
OF BUISINESS ETHICS, 595, 608 (2008): “I did it for my family”, “I did it for the sake of Enron”; “we did it for 
the shareholders”. 
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perspectives that can be made productive for criminological single-case analysis and 
prevention. A main area of application of the theory of neutralization techniques as 
expanded by Festinger’s approach is the decision for or against an economic crime.23 In 
particular, in the area of Economic Criminology, the techniques of neutralization are 
particularly frequently called upon today as an explanatory approach for the generally, 
at least in principle, lawfully oriented offender.24 
 
B. Dissonance strength and its significance for successful neutralization 
 
Given that both Cressey and also Sykes & Matza are exclusively concerned with disso-
nance reduction and not the phenomenon of dissonance as such, they obscure the fact 
that dissonance can occur in various degrees.25 By contrast, Festinger is of the view that a 
certain dissonance would be inherent in all decision situations because for almost every 
cognition a conflicting cognition would exist. But a “strong” dissonance would only 
then emerge if both cognitions are especially important for the individual: 
 
“If two elements are dissonant with each other, the magnitude of the disso-
nance is a function of the importance of the elements. The more important or 
valuable these elements are for the person, the greater is the magnitude of the 
dissonant relationship between them.”26 
Insofar as an assessment for or against a crime is involved, the two determinative cogni-
tions are on the one hand, the non-delinquent self-image of the actor and his orientation 
towards conformity values, and on the other hand, the respective profit or benefit that 
follows from committing the crime. Dissonance follows then if both elements are im-
portant for the perpetrator. The more important they are, the greater the dissonance. 
According to Festinger, dissonance explains the pressure to reduce dissonance. In this 
respect, it is possible to distinguish three ideal-typical adaptation mechanisms from one 
another, which vary according to the magnitude of the dissonant relationship: 
- Type 1: Avoiding the dissonance-producing cognitions. In the case of particu-			
23  Cf. already the placement of techniques of neutralization in the Leipziger Progression Model of White-collar 
Crime (Hendrik Schneider, Das Leipziger Verlaufsmodell wirtschaftskriminellen Handelns, NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT 555 ff. (2007); ibid. 135 ff. (2008), as developed by the author. 
24  James Coleman, Toward an integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime, 2, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOL-
OGY 93, 406 ff. (Sep., 1987); Michael L. Benson, Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvment in 
White Collar Crime, 23, CRIMINOLOGY 583ff. (1985); Tomson H. Nguyen & Henry N. Pontel, Mortage 
origination fraud and and the global economic crisis. A criminal analysis, 9, CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POLI-
CY 591 ff. (2010); Scott M. Kieffer & John J.Sloan, Overcoming moral hurdles: Using techniques of Neutraliza-
tion by White-Collar Crime. Suspects as an Interrogation Tool, 22, SECURITY JOURNAL 1 ff. (2008). 
25
  The topic of dissonance magnitude is at most implied. For example, Sykes/Matza recognize that techniques 
of neutralization cannot always completely shield the individual from feelings of guilt (DAVID MATZA 
GRESHAM M. SYKES, TECHNIQUES OF NEUTRALIZATION: A THEORY OF DELINQUENCY 669 (1957)). In 
other cases, neutralization strategies would not be necessary because the juvenile offender was isolated from 
the “world of conformity”. 
26  LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 28 (1978). 
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larly pronounced dissonance—Festinger speaks in this respect of the “fear of 
dissonance”27—it is conceivable that one does not succeed through neutraliza-
tion strategies to completely eliminate the “psychological discomfort”28. Ra-
ther, in the case of great pressure, the individual would attempt from the outset 
to avoid the dissonance-generating cognitions as such29, or the decision for the 
crime would not be implemented (“withdrawal of the decision”30). Therefore, 
from a criminological point of view, pronounced dissonance can be interpreted 
as a relevant resilience factor. In this respect, it suggests itself for example, that 
reference be made to the research results concerning the connection between 
value orientation and delinquency.31 People who are compelled by traditional 
values according to Festinger’s observations are thus possibly less prone to the 
temptations of advantageous opportunities to commit an offense because the 
idea of violating a norm elicits such a strong cognitive dissonance that it cannot 
be calmed. Therefore, the individual striving for consonant cognitions, rather 
blocks out the advantageous opportunities to commit an offense, increases the 
attractiveness of conduct in conformity with the law through cognitions that 
support this conduct, or surrounds themselves with persons who are commit-
ted to the same ideals and values. The conflict of nevertheless wishing to 
achieve economic profit can be resolved by taking advantage of legitimate 
sources of income and by expanding spheres of activity at the expense of free 
time. 
- Type 2: Dissonance reduction through neutralization. Below the threshold of 
the “fear of dissonance”, neutralization techniques in the sense of dissonance 
reduction strategies are engaged to reduce the pressure and establish conso-
nance. Distinct neutralization strategies are in this case an indicator for a social-
ly-conforming value orientation. They point to a basic desire for societal inclu-
sion. In particular, in the area of economic criminality, which represents a 
group of cases in criminality that is otherwise socially inconspicuous, the perpe-
trator consequently attaches importance to emphasizing that he has not done 
anything unusual, that is to say, nothing out of the ordinary. On this backdrop, 
it is comprehensible that they stress in interviews or before a court that they on-
ly did what everyone else also does (“anybody could’ve done it”, “everybody 
does it”, “it's the values of competitiveness and achievement in Western socie-
			
27  LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 41 (1978). 
28  LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 16 (1978). 
29  LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 41 (1978). 
30  LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 52 (1978). 
31  Alexander Schlegel, Werthaltungen inhaftierter Wirtschaftsdelinquenten, in Wirtschaftskriminalität und 
Werte 113 ff. (2003); Judith M. Collins & Frank L. Schmidt, Personality, Integrity, and White Collar Crime: 
A Construct validity study, 46, PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 295 ff. (1993). 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 2   2017 
HENDRIK SCHNEIDER  |  COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AS A PREVENTION STRATEGY 
 
PAGE  27 
ties that are to blame”32). From the perspective of prevention this therefore does 
not require re-socialization, but rather (only) “neutralizing the techniques of 
neutralization” (see more detail on this below under III). 
- Type 3: Withdrawal into an autonomous sphere of values of a workplace-
related subculture. If there are no apparent neutralization strategies, this sug-
gests that conformity values no longer produce any friction and no guilty con-
science. The value of abiding by the law does not occur in the offender’s cogni-
tions, and hence, there does not follow any dissonance that would have to be 
reduced. In this case, which forms the opposite pole to Type 1, the perpetrator 
accordingly is moving at least in part in an autonomous sphere of values. In the 
law related to economic offenses, this is a specific feature of workplace-related 
subcultures to the extent that these are accompanied by a breakdown in the 
“work-life-balance” and the associated loss of external control by persons out-
side of the work environment.33 An indicator for this are argumentation strate-
gies with which the perpetrator explains after the fact that he no longer noticed 
the illegal actions: “price-fixing had become so common and gone for so many 
years that we lost sight of the fact that it was illegal.”34 
 
C. Dissonance in the case of conduct in conformity with the law 
 
Festinger's theory furthermore demonstrates that techniques of neutralization are not 
only needed in choosing the alternative that is a criminal course of action, but also in 
choosing the course of action that is in conformity with the law. If the individual is ex-
posed to an advantageous opportunity to commit a crime and he recognizes this, he has 
the choice to seize the opportunity or ignore it.35 Whereas the criminological literature to 
date only focused on the cognitive dissonance resulting from a decision to commit the 
offense and against compliance, Festinger’s theory provides space for the problem of 
cognitive dissonance due to missing the advantageous opportunity to commit a crime, 
which is connected with the cognition of losing the yields of a crime. 			
32
  Orly Turgeman-Goldschmidt, Between Hackers and White-Collar Crime Offenders, in Corporate Hacking 
and Technology-Driven Crime: Social Dynamics and Implications 28 (Thomas J. Holt & Bernadette H. 
Schell, 2011). 
33  HENDRIK SCHNEIDER, DER WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFTÄTER IN SEINEN SOZIALEN BEZÜGEN. AKTUELLE 
FORSCHUNGSERGEBNISSE UND KONSEQUENZEN FÜR DIE UNTERNEHMENSPRAXIS 4 ff. (2009); Hendrik 
Schneider & Dieter John, Der Wirtschaftsstraftäter in seinen sozialen Bezügen. Empirische Befunde und 
Konsequenzen für die Unternehmenspraxis, in Wirtschaftskriminalität 159 ff. (Britta Bannenberg & Jörg-
Martin Jehle, 1st ed. 2010).  
34  STUART L. HILLS, CORPORATE VIOLENCE: INJURY AND DEATH FOR PROFIT 191 (1987). 
35  Basic assumption of the Leipziger Progression Model of White-collar Crime: Schneider (Hendrik Schneider, 
Das Leipziger Verlaufsmodell wirtschaftskriminellen Handelns, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT 555ff. 
(2007) and ibid. 135 ff. (2008)). a similar approach in the Choice Theory of White Collar Crime (NEAL 
SHOVER & PETER GRABOSKY, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND THE GREAT RECESSION 429 ff. (2010); ibid. 
641 ff. (2010); NEAL SHOVER & ANDREW HOCHSTETLER, CHOOSING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 114 ff. 
(2007); ibid. (2006); also, John Braithwaite, Diagnostics of white-collar crime prevention, 23, CRIMINOLOGY 
& PUBLIC POLICY 621 ff. (2010)). 
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This aspect can admittedly not be made fruitful for criminal etiology, but certainly for 
resilience research and prevention. Whereas within the framework of prevention, neu-
tralization strategies that pave the path into criminality are to be neutralized to the 
greatest extent possible,36 we very much welcome those that ease the sense of loss of 
having passed over an advantageous opportunity. According to this, one must funda-
mentally distinguish between “negative” (crimino-valent) and “positive” (crimino-
resistant) neutralization strategies37. Criminology has so far only concentrated on one 
side of this. Neutralization strategies that are to be assessed as positive and supportive of 
compliance with the law would have to as yet be formulated. Research results in eco-
nomic victimology38 suggest that there is also in this respect an appeal to higher loyalties. 
Employees in victimized companies report that they also cooperated in uncovering and 
clearing up criminal acts against the company because they had perceived this as the 
“hour of reckoning”. In addition, they apparently felt a lower tolerance level with re-
spect to navigating in a company gray zone than other colleagues. Thus, in this respect, 
it was not only a question for them of compliance with the law in and of itself, but ra-
ther also that of higher-level ideals of fairness and transparency, therefore, cognitions 
through which conduct in conformity with the law can gain in its appeal as compared to 
criminality (or not intervening vis-à-vis criminality). An increase in the attractiveness of 
conduct in compliance with the law or an incentive to return to legality would also be 
conceivable by means of relevant monetary or non-monetary incentive systems (see 
more detail on this under III in prevention strategies). 
 
D. Dissonance in group processes 
 
More clearly than in the criminological works on neutralization techniques, there is also 
a focus with Festinger on the relevance of group processes. To be sure, Sykes & Matza 
already emphasize (in differentiating from Sutherland’s Theory of Differential Associa-
tion), that neutralization strategies can be learned in contact with others. However, in 
addition, Festinger also makes reference to “social support” in the process of dissonance 
reduction.39 
 
Mutual social support in reducing dissonance then occurs if multiple persons perceive 
the same dissonance and must subsequently deal with the identical discomfort. Accord-
ing to Festinger, the mutual social support in “collective dissonance” can even go so far 
that “a large group of people succeed in continuing to adhere to a belief or opinion alt-			
36  Joseph Heath, Business Ethics and Moral Motivation: A Criminological Perspective, 83, JOURNAL OF 
BUISINESS ETHICS, 595, 611 (2008): “The goal [...] would be to neutralize neutralizations”. 
37  Cf. on these basic terms of applied criminology: HANS GÖPPINGER, KRIMINOLOGIE, 218 ff. (6th ed., 2008). 
38
  HENDRIK SCHNEIDER & DIETER JOHN, DAS UNTERNEHMEN ALS OPFER VON WIRTSCHAFTSKRIMINA-
LITÄT – EINE VIKTIMOLOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR IM VERGLEICH (2013). 
39  LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE, 177 (1978). 
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hough clear evidence to the contrary is constantly becoming apparent40: [...] If everyone 
believes it, it must be true without a doubt”.41 Thus, a “UFO cult” studied by Festinger 
managed to still cling to a prophecy of an apocalypse even then as the first predicted date 
of world destruction passed without incident.42 In this case, the only members of the 
cult who turned away in disappointment from the ideas of an imminent apocalypse 
(and the salvation of a select few by aliens) were those that did not exchange views with 
other cult members. Insofar as the error concerning the exact date of the apocalypse was 
collectively confronted, a reinforcement of group cohesion was even apparent. 
 
Consequently, group processes influence not only the appeal and the belief in the cor-
rectness of certain cognitions, but also assist with marginalizing and rejecting dissonant 
cognitions.43 From an economic criminology perspective, in this respect for instance, the 
recognizable neutralization strategies of management personnel and established employ-
ees are relevant for the employees of a company. If the necessity of lawful conduct is 
only then recognized by management personnel and experienced colleagues if a specific 
risk of discovery exists, and the norm violation is otherwise consistently neutralized, 
contagion effects are obvious. Therefore, techniques of neutralization are passed on in 
the company hierarchy from the top to the bottom and dissenters are collectively and 
successfully defamed and/or neutralized as “killjoys” or “naysayers”. This applies, as the 
results of the research project “Corporate Compliance – Legal Limits and the Empirical 
Effects of a New Form of Company Organization”44 of Leipzig University makes appar-
ent, in many companies, even to the individual compliance officer. They speak of—also 
with regard to their superiors—serious problems with being accepted: “I am perceived 
as a killjoy” or “I once again needed an investigative proceeding so that anyone listened 
to me”. 
 
The rejection of persons with a different opinion—for example, from the legal depart-
ment or the compliance office—can go so far that the cognitions of dissidents that are in 
conflict with certain cognitions are no longer even perceived. Under these circumstanc-
es, dissonance no longer occurs and consequently, it also does not require neutralization 			
40  LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 196 (1978). 
41  LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 198 (1978). 
42  LEON FESTINGER & HENRY RIECKEN & STANLEY SCHACHTER, WHEN PROPHECY FAILS: A SOCIAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF MORDERN GROUP THAT PREDICTED THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD 
(1964). 
43
  LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 182 (1978). 
44  Hendrik Schneider & Kevin Grau & Kristin Kießling, „Der Schock von Berlin saß tief!“ – Ergebnisse eines 
empirischen Forschungsvorhabens zu Compliance im Gesundheitswesen und in der Pharmaindustrie, 2, COR-
PORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 48 ff. (2013); Hendrik Schneider & Kristin Kißling, Compliance im 
Unternehmen – Wo steht die Pharmaindustrie? Ergebnisse eines empirischen Forschungsvorhabens zur Ver-
breitung und Wirkung von Compliance Instrumenten in deutschen Unternehmen, 6, ARZNEIMITTEL & 
RECHT, 261 ff. (2012); Hendrik Schneider & Burkhard Boemke & Kevin Grau & Kristin Kießling, Evidenz-
basierte Kriminalprävention im Unternehmen. Wirksamkeit von Compliance Maßnahmen in der deutschen 
Wirtschaft – Ein empirisches Forschungsvorhaben, 9, DENKSTRÖME, JOURNAL DER SÄCHSISCHEN AKADE-
MIE DER WISSENSCHAFT 79 ff. (2012). 
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by means of relevant dissonance reduction strategies. This is demonstrated once again in 
particular in workplace-related subcultures. Where there is long-term and ongoing en-
tanglement in the workplace-related subculture, the signs of normality and deviance are 
reversed and breaking the law is no longer reflected in the cognitions of the actors. The 
reasons for this are, for example, the findings identified in the study “The Economic 
Offender in his Social Surroundings”45, that in one case of significant criminal offenses 
perpetrated in the context of the workplace-related subculture, the order to the busi-
ness-consulting firm to resolve the criminal circumstances within the company was is-
sued personally by one of the principal offenders. This finding is also corroborated in 
other studies: “Membership in a deviant subgroup plays an important role in ‘normaliz-
ing’ this otherwise proscribed conduct. Without the supportive group, the ‘sinning self 
threatens to overwhelm the working self’”.46 
III. KNOWLEDGE GAINED FOR COMPANY-INTERNAL PREVENTATIVE 
MEASURES 
 
A. Strategies for neutralizing, techniques of neutralization 
 
Consequently, in-house compliance programs should primarily rely on creating an at-
mosphere or corporate culture47 in which common neutralization strategies are not 
accepted. Evolved cultures of collective neutralization strategies (compare from the area 
of cooperation in health care, for example, the arguments for ensuring acceptance of 
certain problematical practices in “pharma marketing”)48 should be made a subject of 
discussion and deliberated. 
 
As stated, the techniques of neutralization involve relatively fragile lines of argumenta-
tion that are amenable to a change in group processes. Just as they can be subsequently 
stabilized by group processes, they may be destabilized and delegitimized by group pro-
cesses and a corresponding reflection. Compliance workshops in which the target group 
is made aware of the neutralization strategies and the problem of cognitive dissonance 			
45  HENDRIK SCHNEIDER, DER WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFTÄTER IN SEINEN SOZIALEN BEZÜGEN. AKTUELLE 
FORSCHUNGSERGEBNISSE UND KONSEQUENZEN FÜR DIE UNTERNEHMENSPRAXIS 4 ff. (2009); Hendrik 
Schneider & Dieter John, Der Wirtschaftsstraftäter in seinen sozialen Bezügen. Empirische Befunde und 
Konsequenzen für die Unternehmenspraxis, in Wirtschaftskriminalität 159 ff. (Britta Bannenberg & Jörg-
Martin Jehle, 1st ed. 2010). 
46  GERALD MARS, CHEATS AT WORK. AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WORKPLACE CRIME (1982). 
47  GERALD MARS, CHEATS AT WORK. AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WORKPLACE CRIME (1982). 
48  GERALD MARS, CHEATS AT WORK. AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WORKPLACE CRIME 48 (1982); In more 
detail: Hendrik Schneider & Kevin Grau & Kristin Kießling, „Der Schock von Berlin saß tief!“ – Ergebnisse 
eines empirischen Forschungsvorhabens zu Compliance im Gesundheitswesen und in der Pharmaindustrie, 2, 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 48 ff. (2013); Hendrik Schneider & Kristin Kißling, Compliance 
im Unternehmen – Wo steht die Pharmaindustrie? Ergebnisse eines empirischen Forschungsvorhabens zur 
Verbreitung und Wirkung von Compliance Instrumenten in deutschen Unternehmen, 6, ARZNEIMITTEL & 
RECHT 261 ff. (2012). 
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are suitable for this purpose. For example, an introduction can rely on hypothetical 
dilemma situations that are taken from the respective markets in the work environment 
of the employees to be trained. In discussions concerning such situations and the possi-
ble courses of action, neutralization strategies can be made apparent and thus brought to 
a level of critical reflection. Already the identification of dissonance-generating cogni-
tions and the reconstruction of common neutralization techniques had (according to 
the insights gained in our study of the effectiveness of compliance instruments) positive 
effects with regard to awareness vis-à-vis certain established mindsets and argumentation 
patterns.49 
 
Promising are furthermore programs that not only illustrate the content of relevant 
norms, but also their objectives and legal policy significance.50 In this respect, the goal is 
to undermine and neutralize the neutralization strategies of “appeal to higher loyalties” 
and the “rejection of penal provisions”. Decisive in the sense of consolidating the in-
sights attained is furthermore that holding onto the common structures and established 
dissonance reduction strategies is no longer tolerated by the top management (so-called 
“tone from the top”). 
 
B. Stabilizing and supporting desirable dissonance reduction strategies 
 
Within the framework of prevention, it must also be taken into consideration that a 
decision for lawful behavior can produce dissonance. In this sense, the company can rely 
on a double strategy in which compliance is consistently rewarded and non-compliance 
is consistently rejected. If there are odds for the employee that compliance will be re-
warded, this reduces the cognitive dissonance in the event of missing out on a promising 
opportunity. The employee will ease his sense of loss over the missed profit opportunity 
with the argument that he also has the possibility to earn, even by missing the promising 
opportunity, an “extra bonus” in the form of a monetary or non-monetary compensa-
tion component. 
 
By contrast, in the case of a low fixed salary and high sales commission, for instance, 
there exists an incentive to also effectuate the conclusion of a contract for the product to 			
49  Cf. already the approach (Michael Walter, Wie kann ein Mensch so etwas tun? in Festschrift für Hans-Dieter 
Schwind 1155 ff. (Thomas Feltes & Christian Pfeiffer & Gernot Steinhilper, 2006)), who in this respect focus-
es on “Unmasking Illusory Legitimations”. 
50  In more detail this Joseph Heath, Business Ethics and Moral Motivation: A Criminological Perspective, 83, 
JOURNAL OF BUISINESS ETHICS 595 ff.: Of course, the current developments in the law of economic offenses 
are not very favorable for the practice of respecting norms. Due to a lack of precise definition of specific crim-
inal offenses and individual features of the elements of an offense, it is increasingly already difficult to clarify 
the content of the norm to the party to whom the norm is addressed. Added to this are conflicts in values 
and the lack of reasonability in certain decisions of the legislature and courts, which can encourage the neu-
tralization strategies of rejecting penal provisions; see on this in detail based on examples, Hendrik Schneider, 
Wachstumsbremse Wirtschaftsstrafrecht. Problematische Folgen überzogener Steuerungsansprüche und man-
gelnder Randschärfe in der wirtschaftsstrafrechtlichen Begriffsbildung, 1, NEUE KRIMINALPOLITIK 30 ff. 
(2012).  
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be sold by improper means.51 An employee who complies with the laws can therefore in 
case of doubt, clearly earn less than his colleague acting in a criminal manner. This also 
generates cognitive dissonance in the lawfully acting colleague for which the company—
that does not wish to dispense with sales commissions—should provide a neutralization 
opportunity. Thus, for example, a compliance scorecard could be implemented and 
taken into consideration for promotions or the allowance of awards or bonuses. Fur-
thermore, the risk of discovery of the criminal sales strategies could be increased by way 
of periodic compliance audits not bound to a specific occasion, and with this, the appeal 
of an opportunity for non-compliance reduced. 
 
Of course, a prerequisite for such programs is that there is a genuine company interest in 
compliance, and that economic success through unlawful corporate activities is also 
frowned upon by top management. This stance and attitude towards compliance risks 
and the legal boundaries of economic success is definitely verifiable. According to the 
present insights about compliance in the German economy, it is not to be assumed that 
the relevant departments universally merely have a “fig leaf” function and should exclu-
sively aim for a positive public perception.52 Circumstances that are indicative of a seri-
ous interest in functional compliance are, for example, the qualifications profile appar-
ent in job advertisements and the qualifications of the compliance officer, as well as the 
scope of reporting obligations that go all the way up to the supervisory board in compa-
nies that value compliance (so-called dotted reporting line) and therefore include moni-
toring of the board or managing directors by the compliance officer.53 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
The starting points illustrated by way of example here that are based on in-house 
measures for prevention make clear that the theory concerning techniques of neutraliza-
tion developed by Sykes & Matza definitely has a “quantum leap potential”, in particu-
lar, in the area of applied economic criminology, and enriches and expands our 			
51
  Cf. on this the Strategies of Selling Property Loans, which resulted in the so-called subprime crisis, Neal 
Shover & Peter Grabosky, White-collar crime and the Great Recession 429 ff. (2010); ibid. 641 ff. (2010). 
52  Skeptical towards compliance as a measure for the prevention of corporate criminality: Bernd Schünemann, 
Brennpunkte des Strafrechts in der entwickelten Industriegesellschaft, in Empirische und dogmatische Fun-
damente kriminalpolitischer Impetus (Roland, Hefendehl, 2005), p. 369; Roland Hefendehl, Corporate Gov-
ernance und Business Ethics: Scheinberuhigung oder Alternativen bei der Bekämpfung der Wirtschaftskrimi-
nalität?, JURISTEN ZEITUNG 125 (2006); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Pisk Shifting, and the Para-
dox of Compliance,52, VANDERBIT LAW REVIEW 1343 ff. (1999). 
53  HENDRIK SCHNEIDER & DIETER JOHN, DAS UNTERNEHMEN ALS OPFER VON WIRTSCHAFTSKRIMINA-
LITÄT – EINE VIKTIMOLOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR IM VERGLEICH (2013); 
Hendrik Schneider & Kristin Kißling, Compliance im Unternehmen – Wo steht die Pharmaindustrie? Er-
gebnisse eines empirischen Forschungsvorhabens zur Verbreitung und Wirkung von Compliance Instrumenten 
in deutschen Unternehmen, 6, ARZNEIMITTEL & RECHT 261 ff. (2012); Hendrik Schneider & Kevin Grau & 
Kristin Kießling, „Der Schock von Berlin saß tief!“ – Ergebnisse eines empirischen Forschungsvorhabens zu 
Compliance im Gesundheitswesen und in der Pharmaindustrie, 2, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 
48 ff. (2013). 
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knowledge of the origins of an offense and prevention of future offenses.  
The “critical self-reflection” of the perpetrator with regard to the “legitimation represen-
tations of earlier actions” (p. 1170) (rightly presented by Walter with the example of the 
most severe criminal offenses) cannot happen however, (according to the view applied 
here) only after the offense within the context of a “new cognitive re-socialization”, but 
rather ideally already before the initial delinquency in the sense of reflecting about the 
decision processes; and this self-reflection can be made productive for prevention. In this 
respect, and integrated into a compliance program, this involves measures of ensuring an 
internal company integrity structure in which adequate handling of cognitive disso-
nance is cultivated, and in which crimino-valent neutralization techniques are neutral-
ized, and crimino-resistant neutralization strategies are reinforced. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the role of ‘systems of beliefs’ and disciplinary and professional norms 
and culture as a potential source of conflicts of interest in decision-making by professionals. 
In particular it argues that ‘intellectual’ views and professional values and agendas, may 
represent a potent source of potential conflicts of interest, which may not be readily recog-
nised or fully understood across diverse disciplinary or professional settings, because of dif-
fering disciplinary/professional world-views, training and priorities. The article argues that 
there is a need for more open and honest cross-disciplinary conversations about how conflicts 
of interest are constructed and navigated in different scholarly and professional contexts. 
This is key to unmasking potential conflicts of interest that may unconsciously be sourced 
by particular intellectual views, positions and systems of beliefs, particularly when they are 
unquestioningly assumed to be beneficent. This discussion is important for decision-makers, 			
1
  I wish to acknowledge my research assistants who have contributed to this article: Shirley Huang for her work 
on an excellent literature review that forms the spine of this article and Jacqueline Krynda for her general re-
search assistance and editing support. 
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such as university human research ethics committees and other cross-disciplinary institu-
tional or organisational (corporate and non-corporate) decision-making or review bodies, 
for whom potential conflicts of interest are a core consideration in their activities and de-
liberations.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As Chair and member of an institutional Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) 
I’m regularly provoked to think about potential conflicts of interest (COI) that might 
arise and impact on the research that is the subject of the HREC’s review, as well as the 
potential COI that may arise in the ethical review process itself. An HREC is composed 
of a number of members from a wide range of professional, cultural and social back-
grounds.2 Some recent discussions around my HREC table have highlighted for me just 
how diverse committee members’ understandings can be, of what constitutes a conflict 
of interest, and how potential COI may not even be considered relevant, due to a person’s 
worldview or how they perceive and situate themselves politically, intellectually or pro-
fessionally. Increasingly I have been alerted to how particular disciplinary backgrounds 
and professional training might influence people’s assessment of whether a potential con-
flict of interest might be enlivened, its nature and its likely impact on decision-making. In 
particular, I have started to think about possible differences between the scientific and 
medical profession’s conception of COI, and that of other disciplines and professions, 
such as the legal profession. And whether, such differences matter, and if so, how and 
why? 
 
Against this backdrop, this article seeks to explore how COI are perceived, constructed 
and prioritised in different disciplinary and professional settings. This is an important 
discussion for institutional ethics committees and other similar boards and organisational 
bodies which are constituted by a diverse professional and lay membership (whether in a 
corporate, governmental or academic context) and whose core activities and decision-
making involve identifying and thinking about the impact of potential conflicts of inter-
est. 
 
The purpose of this article is to highlight and remind us that potential COI may be inter-
preted and viewed in different ways by people from diverse backgrounds, and perhaps, 
that in certain settings, a more explicit discussion needs to occur around potential COI, 
so as to ensure that everyone is on the same page and that decisions are being made in an 
open and transparent way, and with common understanding. Sometimes, as decision-
makers, we have to be prepared and equipped to more readily step outside our own 
worldview or professional lens, in order to honestly and genuinely engage with potential 
COI, and thereby avoid introducing unconscious bias and unfairness into our decisions, 
even if (and perhaps especially if) we are convinced that what we, or others are doing, is 
for the better ‘good’. 
II. WHAT IS THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST? 
 			
2
  Most institutional ethical review committees mandate inclusion of clinicians, lawyers, laypeople, pastors or 
spiritual leaders, and researchers. 
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As a point of departure we need to, at least generally, ask, what we understand as consti-
tuting a ‘conflict of interest’. COI (also referred to as ‘competing interests’, ‘dual commit-
ments’, and ‘dual loyalties’) describe circumstances in which a primary interest (matters 
of professional judgment) may be at risk of undue influence by secondary interests.3 Al-
ternatively, conflicts of interest can be framed as “a structure that carries an invitation”: 
 
The structure is comprised of (1) a relationship featuring a strong obligation 
based on trust – for professions, a loyalty in which the provider places the bene-
ficiary’s interests above his or her own interests, and (2) an opportunity to act 
contrary to that obligation. The invitation arises when such an opportunity is 
sufficiently attractive that it poses a significant temptation to override the obli-
gation.4 
 
The distinction between primary and secondary interests is drawn by separating the re-
quirements and obligations of an entity’s (individual or group) particular professional 
activity or role (e.g. duties to clients and patients, conducting or reviewing research) from 
‘external’ interests that are referable solely to their private benefit, involvement in other 
activities or their existing relationships.5 These secondary interests can broadly be catego-
rised as either being “financial” or “nonfinancial” in nature.  
 
Financial COI can take a myriad of forms and may include: research grants and contracts; 
consultancies; employment opportunities; positions on committees and boards; stock 
ownership or options; honoraria; intellectual property (including patents, royalties, and 
licensing fees); paid expert testimony; and participation in speakers’ bureaus or other pro-
fessional forums or honours.  
 
Non-financial COI (NFCOI) are more difficult to characterise. Most definitions of 
NFCOI describe such conflicts in the negative -encompassing all undue secondary inter-
ests that are not financial.6 The three most commonly identified NFCOI, which are of 
particular concern to this essay, relate to ‘systems of belief’, professional objectives, and 
			
3
  Pascal Probst et al., Thirty Years of Disclosure of Conflict of Interest in Surgery Journals, 157, SURGERY 627, 
627 (2015); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF MEDICAL JOURNAL EDITORS (ICMJE), RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE CONDUCT OF REPORTING, EDITING AND PUBLICATION OF SCHOLARLY WORK IN MEDICAL 
JOURNALS (2016); Bernard Lo & Marilyn J Field, Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, EDUCATION, AND 
PRACTICE (National Academies Press, 2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK22942/. 
4
  E Haavi Morreim, Taking a Lesson from the Lawyers: Defining and Addressing Conflict of Interest, 11 AMER-
ICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 33 (2011). 
5
  Probst et al., supra at 627. 
6
  Richard S Saver, Is It Really All About the Money? Reconsidering Non-Financial Interests in Medical Re-
search, 40 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS 467,468 (2012); Meera Viswanathan et al., A Proposed 
Approach May Help Systematic Reviews Retain Needed Expertise While Minimizing Bias from Nonfinancial 
Conflicts of Interest, 67 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1229, 1231 (2014). 
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personal relationships. 7 
 
Systems of belief, as a source of conflict, can be pervasive, encompassing intellectual, po-
litical, religious or professional beliefs, and may unwittingly result in bias in decision-mak-
ing. ‘Intellectual’ COI refer to academic or scholarly “activities that create the potential 
for attachment to a specific point of view that could unduly influence an individual’s 
judgement about a specific”8 matter or recommendation. For researchers, it has been sug-
gested that “preset beliefs in the likely outcome or a sincere conviction that a particular 
result is correct are more potent confounders of unbiased observation than financial in-
terests” because of their potential to influence the entire research process, and especially 
the interpretation of evidence or data.9 Similarly, researchers may possess “ambition to 
advance … knowledge, investigative zeal, and intellectual passion” that might “undermine 
investigator objectivity and subject protection”.10 Such ‘intellectual’ COI may arise in 
many other academic or professional contexts beyond that of the ‘researcher’. For exam-
ple, it may apply to health or medical professionals involved in new cutting-edge thera-
pies, lawyers pursuing justice for the disadvantaged or oppressed; indeed in any profes-
sional context where those involved may unquestioningly assume and pursue the benefi-
cence of their activities. In the context of an institutional ethics committee or other similar 
review or organisational committee, the power of such intellectual COI may be amplified 
by the group membership and the collective force of the group’s convictions. Members 
of an HREC, for example, are often deeply committed and passionate about the ethical 
conduct of research. Their perception and strong belief in the beneficence of ethical re-
view and the legitimacy of the ethical review process, creates a particular intellectual prism 
through which decisions are made. This may unconsciously obscure and entrench poten-
tial conflicts of interest around the table, and influence the committee’s deliberations and 
decision-making, perhaps through a strengthened collective conviction over time, as the 
group’s identity and ideological unity is fortified. 
 
Professional objectives (which are not unnecessarily unrelated to ‘systems of beliefs’) may 
also be a source of potential conflicts of interest. These may cover a wide range of second-			
7
  ICMJE, supra at 3; Lo and Field, supra; Claire Johnson, Conflict of Interest in Scientific Publications: A Histor-
ical Review and Update, 33 JOURNAL OF MANIPULATIVE AND PHYSIOLOGICAL THERAPEU-
TICS 81 (2010); Ravi P Mahajan, Conflicts of Interest in Medical Journals, 41 COLOMBIAN JOURNAL OF 
ANESTHESIOLOGY 179 (2013). 
8
  David Lau, Addressing Conflict of Interest and Bias in Research, Education and Clinical Practice, 39 CANA-
DIAN JOURNAL OF DIABETES 247, 248 (2015); Khaled Shawwa et al., Requirements of Clinical Journals for 
Authors’ Disclosure of Financial and Non-Financial Conflicts of Interest: A Cross Sectional Study, 11 PLoS 
ONE 1 (2016); Elie A Akl et al., Considering Intellectual, in Addition to Financial, Conflicts of Interest Proved 
Important in a Clinical Practice Guideline: A Descriptive Study, 67 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 
1222 (2014).; see also Saver 2012, supra at 468, Viswanathan et al., supra at 1232. 
9
  Ross E McKinney Jr & Heather H Pierce, Strategies for Addressing a Broader Definition of Conflicts of Inter-
est, 317 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1727, 1727 (2017). 
10
  Saver, supra at 468. 
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ary interests and motivations, including career advancement (both for tenure and promo-
tion), and recognition from peers (including honours and prestige) which take on a par-
ticular significance or importance in a particular disciplinary or professional context.11 
Professional drivers and established indicia or ‘models’ of success within a professional 
group may be a strong influencing force and source of COI. Such may be imbued in pro-
fessional identity and notions of professional ‘success’ right from the beginning of their 
university study and training and thereafter reinforced through professional milestones 
and culture.12 
 
Likewise personal relationships with the potential to influence professional behaviours or 
judgments and decisions can source a conflict of interest.13 Relationships with institutions 
and other professional entities for example, may also have the potential to conflict with 
primary interests.14 One area of growing attention is the ever expanding development of 
partnerships between organisations and institutions with corporate sponsors and fun-
ders, and the potential impact of such in normalising the ‘demands of the market’ and 
‘commercial interests’ at the institutional or organisational level and thereby perhaps ob-
scuring potential COI.15 
 
Such potential COI grounded in professional objectives, institutional or organisational 
membership and roles, and personal or professional relationships are relevant to decisions 
or ‘choices’ made by researchers and other professionals in their professional and related 
activities. They may also, for example, play out in the decisions of HREC’s and other sim-
ilar committees or bodies that are charged with institutional or organisational related de-
cisions. It may be difficult for such committees and bodies to readily appreciate how such 
specific potential conflicts of interest are manifesting for particular members, when the 
membership is varied, and to unpack these around the table. This is because some of these 
potential sources of COI may not be readily ‘visible’ or appreciated by all members who 
work outside the institution or organisation, or for those who have a different disciplinary 
or professional lens or focus, or are situated within a specific institutional or organisa-
tional quarter and are influenced by that particular (potentially insular) world view and 
understanding, and so are unable to identify even the need to interrogate the probity of 
such broader influences. Those within a particular profession on the other hand, may be 
blind to the impact of such influences on their own thinking and decision-making, be-
cause such influences may be so deeply entrenched in their own professional culture and 			
11
  Id. at 468; Viswanathan et al., supra at 1232. 
12
  Cruess et al., A Schematic Representation of the Professional Identity Formation and Socialization of Medical 
Students and Residents: A Guide for Medical Educators, 90 ACADEMIC MEDICINE 718 (2015); Christine 
Cerniglia Brown, Professional Identity Formation: Working Backwards to Move the Profession Forward, 61 
LOYOLA LAW REVIEW 313, 320 (2015). 
13
  Viswanathan et al., supra at 1232. 
14
  Arthur L Caplan, Is Industry Money the Root of All Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research?, 59 ANNALS 
OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE 87 (2012); Id. at 1232. 
15
  Christopher Mayes et al., Conflicts of Interest in Neoliberal times: Perspectives of Australian Medical Students, 
25 HEALTH SOCIOLOGY REVIEW 256 (2016). 
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identity that they are simply not ever brought into question. Furthermore the dominance 
of particular disciplines or professionals in some professional settings or on committees 
or in boardrooms may further serve to silence ‘outsider’ or ‘marginal’ voices and render 
such potential conflicts of interest even more opaque; preventing them from being scru-
tinised and unmasked. 
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND HUMAN RESEARCH 
 
Codes on ethical conduct in human research generally explicitly address and eschew con-
flicts of interest. For example, the Australian National Health and Medical Research 
Council (NHMRC) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 2007 
requires that institutions “establish transparent processes to identify and manage actual 
and potential conflicts of interest involving: a. the institution itself; b. researchers; or c. 
ethical review bodies, their members or advisors.”16 Statements of this kind address the 
vital policy objective of building public trust in the human research ethical review process 
which as a broad-based objective, includes four specific goals: 
 
1. To protect the rights and welfare of human participants; 
2. To promote social justice, especially in ensuring equitable subject  
selection and a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of research;  
3. To produce results that benefit society, especially in public health 
research;  
4. To foster public trust in both the methods and results of research, in 
order to ensure funding and the recruitment of future subjects.17 
 
If the full spectrum of potential COI are not recognised and carefully considered in ethical 
or other like review processes, they can impact and indeed compromise not only research 
processes but the ethical or other review processes themselves, and ultimately such im-
portant public policy interests and objectives. Potential conflicts of interest can impact 
every stage of research from the choice of research topic (“to choose a topic of research 
that has the potential for better funding or other financial benefits”), study design, data 
analysis and interpretation, through to data reporting and dissemination of findings.18 
 
While many consequences of COI on research may be unintended or even perhaps un-
conscious, the pursuit of secondary interests, to the detriment of research integrity, has 
been observed and is well recorded. Berger, for example, refers to ‘selective inertia’ (“an 
unnatural selection of research methods based on which are most likely to establish the 
preferred conclusions, rather than on which are most valid”) as a mechanism through 			
16
  Section 5.4.1. 
17
  David B Resnik, Public Trust as a Policy Goal for Research with Human Subjects, 10 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
BIOETHICS 15, 16 (2010). 
18
  Lindsay Hampson & James Montie, Conflict of Interest in Urology, 187 JOURNAL OF UROLOGY 1971, 1974. 
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which researchers can consciously sway their research results in a biased or flawed way.19 
Other research has discovered active efforts on the part of researchers to alter or suppress 
data. For example, Martinson et al. and Carragee et al. reported that industry influence or 
funding led to pressure to suppress or underreport negative data.20 Additionally, Martin-
son et al in a 2005 US federally-sponsored survey of 3,000 academic scientists, found that 
15% of them admitted to altering study design or results based on pressure stemming from 
an external funding source. Conversely, it has been suggested that perhaps “the disclosure 
of conflicts of interest may exacerbate biases in the presentation of research by creating 
the impetus to compensate for the disclosure”21 creating a reverse bias in presentation of 
findings against sponsor interest. Either way, such COI are potentially biasing research 
processes and its outcomes. 
 
A. A Medical Research 
 
The pre-eminence of considerations of COI in medical research has been primarily con-
nected to the growing dependence of research on the financial contributions of industry 
(see, e.g., Brody, 2011), whether directly from a corporation itself or through organisations 
and government agencies that work with industry to promote particular devices or phar-
maceuticals.22 References to a “medical-industrial complex” date back to the 1980s; and it 
has been suggested that presence of an industry sponsor (especially one whose medical 
intervention is the subject of the research) is “the factor most likely to exert an inappro-
priate influence on investigator professionalism”.23 Strikingly today, two-thirds of bio-
medical research globally is supported by industry. Studies have also begun to investigate 
suggestions that the larger the size of financial incentives, the greater the COI concerns.24 
 
Moreover, the ability to conduct human research in medical fields relies on the ability to 
source research subjects (often in large samples). However, in the field of pharmaceutical 
			
19
  Vance W Berger, Conflicts of Interest, Selective Inertia, and Research Malpractice in Randomized Clinical 
Trials: An Unholy Trinity, 21 SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS 857, 857 (2015). 
20
  Brian Martinson et al., Scientists Behaving Badly, 435 NATURE 737 (2005); Eugene Carragee et al., A Critical 
Review of Recombinant Human Bone Morphogenetic Protein-2 Trials in Spinal Surgery: Emerging Safety Con-
cerns and Lessons Learned, 11 The SPINE JOURNAL 471 (2011). 
21
  AG Dunn et al., Conflict of Interest Disclosure in Biomedical Research: A Review of Current Practices, Biases, 
and the Role of Public Registries in Improving Transparency, 1 RESEARCH INTEGRITY AND PEER REVIEW 1, 2 
(2016). 
22  J Diels et al., Association of Financial or Professional Conflict of Interest to Research Outcomes on Health Risks 
or Nutritional Assessment Studies of Genetically Modified Products, 36 FOOD POLICY 197, 198 (2011). 
23  Probst et al., supra at 627; Dunn et al., supra at 1. 
24  Justin Chakma et al., Asia’s Ascent – Global Trends in Biomedical R&D Expenditures, 370, NEW ENGLAND 
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 3, 3-6 (2014); see Bernard Lo & Deborah Grady, Payments to Physicians: Does the 
Amount of Money Make a Difference?, 317 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1719 
(2017). 
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development in particular, there has been increasing demand and competition for sub-
jects due to “the spectacular increase in research activity over the last two decades, an in-
crease in large part driven by growing commercial interests in research”.25 This is an area 
which has become rife with the influence of FCOIs. To attract referrals, industry engages 
in practices such as offering substantial payments to researchers and clinicians for refer-
rals, invitations to make well-paid presentations of research findings or to participate in 
prestigious seminars, the appointment of researchers to lucrative positions on sponsors’ 
scientific advisory boards and specialised committees, and paid consulting relationships.26 
In some industry-sponsored trials, there have even been reports of companies determin-
ing the authorship of study results on the basis of physicians’ patient enrolment figures.27 
 
In the US, the seeming ubiquity of this issue in the medical profession has even produced 
legislative intervention specifically targeting the profession and its industrial affiliates. 
The Physical Payments Sunshine Act (PPSA), signed into law in 2010 as part of the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, requires pharmaceutical, medical device, bio-
logical, and medical supply manufacturers to report to the Department of Health and 
Human Services any payments to physicians and teaching hospitals that exceed US$10; 
the payments are then made a matter of public record via a database.28 Proposals have also 
been made to devise methods for operationalising FCOIs, especially in the scientific and 
medical communities, including through “FCOI scales” that express the nature and ex-
tent of FCOIs on research, with a numerical score correlating to descriptive terms for po-
tential biases and sample conflicts.29  
 
The presence of COIs in human research, especially FCOIs, may exert an influence over 
the process and results of the research. This influence may be subtle; researchers “might 
become more lenient with respect to informed consent procedures, they may convince 
themselves that research participation is in their patient’s best interests, or they may be 
overly flexible with regard to the study inclusion and exclusion criteria”.30 In more meas-
urable terms, there have been extensive academic attempts to measure the potential influ-
ence of COI on the results of medical and dental research (predominant clinical trials) 			
25  TRUDO LEMMENS & PAUL B MILLER, THE HUMAN SUBJECTS TRADE: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND REGULA-
TORY REMEDIES TO DEAL WITH RECRUITMENT INCENTIVES AND TO PROTECT SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY 
LAW AND ETHICS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, 135-136 (Trudo Lemmens & Duff Waring, 2017). 
26  Id. at 135. 
27  Id. at 141. 
28  For further background, see Susan Chimonas, Frederica Stahl & David J Rothman, Exposing Conflicts of In-
terest in Psychiatry: Does Transparency Matter?, 35 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 
490 (2012); Susan L Norris et al., Characteristics of Physicians Receiving Large Payments from Pharmaceutical 
Companies and the Accuracy of Their Disclosures in Publications: An Observational Study, 13 BMC MEDICAL 
ETHICS 24, 25 (2012). 
29  S V M Maharaj, A New Method for Scoring Financial Conflicts of Interest, 21(1) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
OF OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 49 (2015). 
30  Supra at 139. 
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involving human subjects. The overwhelming, but not universal, consensus appears to be 
that the presence of COI, whether financial or non-financial and whether disclosed or not 
disclosed, are linked with the particular outcomes being measured.31 
 
B. Non-medical Research 
 
Despite a dominance of research into COI related to medical and health research, COI 
concerns have arisen, and are increasingly being discussed also in other disciplinary con-
texts. In the humanities and social sciences, research involving community-based partici-
pation can be affected by ‘partnership tensions’, both as a financial and nonfinancial 
source of conflict. Just as industry sponsors may have an influence on study design for 
medical studies, pressure from institutional partners may result, for example, in the ex-
pulsion of particular community participants in order to ensure the ‘success’ of the re-
search:  
 
Given the centrality of community participation to CBPR, deliberate expulsion and ex-
clusion of community participants would not be a decision taken lightly and might be 
influenced by the researcher’s perception of risk of non-compliance (with requirements 
of funding bodies, universities, service providers or government). We highlight the ethical 
challenge for researchers faced with institutional conflicts of interest who make the deci-
sion to exclude community members from CBPR for ‘institutional self-protection’. To 
remain faithful to the emancipatory empowering paradigm would mean to avoid falling 
back on traditional conceptions of research and tokenistic participation when principles 
of CBPR, including community empowerment, threaten research success. Silencing can 
itself be detrimental to research results and interventions by missing the “authentic com-
munity voice”.32  
 
Other potential conflicts of interest may arise when professionals assume multiple roles 
in ‘social’ based research, for example, increasingly in higher education settings we see 
‘teachers’ also engaged as ‘pedagogical researchers’.  A conflict may arise when the teacher 
wishes to use student-learning data, involve students as participants in their research, or 			
31  E.g. Lotte E van Nierop et al., Source of Funding in Experimental Studies of Mobile Phone Use on Health: 
Update of Systematic Review, 11 COMPTES RENDUS PHYSIQUE 622 (2010); Diels et al., supra; Tatiana Lerner 
et al., The Prevalence and Influence of Self-Reported Conflicts of Interest by Editorial Authors of Phase III 
Cancer Trials, 33 CONTEMPORARY CLINICAL TRIALS 1019 (2012); Haris Riaz et al., Conflicts of Interest and 
Outcomes of Cardiovascular Trials, 117 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CARDIOLOGY 858 (2016); Andreas Lundh et 
al., INDUSTRY SPONSORSHIP AND RESEARCH OUTCOME (Report, 2017); Elton Leite et al., Trial Sponsorship 
and Self-Reported Conflicts of Interest in Breast Cancer Radiation Therapy: An Analysis of Prospective Clinical 
Trials, 33 THE BREAST 29 (2017). 
32  Community Based Participatory Research (CBPR) is generally understood as a collaborative approach to re-
search that equitably involves all partners in the research process and in shared decision-making, in recognition 
of partner expertise and the unique strengths of each partner, see Elena Wilson, Amanda Kenny & Virginia 
Dickson-Swift, Ethical Challenges of Community Based Participatory Research: Exploring Researchers’ Expe-
rience, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 1 (2017) doi: 
10.1080/13645579.2017.1296714. 
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perhaps also other teaching staff.33Another example is provided by Lunt and Fouché, who 
note the potential conflict when social workers assume the dual roles of ‘social worker 
practitioner’ and ‘practitioner researcher’. 34 This conflict materialises when the social 
worker wishes to undertake their own research and the primary respondents will be clients 
or staff, thereby affecting the practitioner’s relationships. These types of COI may pose a 
challenge to duty of care issues in relation to clients or students, while separate challenges 
will arise in relation to the reporting of results and proper acknowledgement of colleagues’ 
contributions. It may also affect clients’, students’ and colleagues’ ability or willingness to 
exercise their right not to participate in (or to withdraw from) the research without fear 
of negative consequences. Institutions will usually have ethical rules in place to protect 
potential research subjects, but ‘probing research interests’, particularly where vulnerable 
or ‘dependent’ individuals are involved, may tempt researchers to breach their responsi-
bility and do “more-than-least harm” to their subjects.35  
 
This discussion so far has highlighted that research grounded in different disciplinary 
spheres may give rise to certain disciplinary specific potential conflicts of interest which 
may not translate to or equally prevail within other research fields or which may assume 
a different form and with different impact. Accordingly researchers working within dif-
ferent fields of research may not appreciate the full context and culture of potential con-
flicts of interest in other fields or may, based on their own disciplinary context and expe-
rience, misconstrue or misunderstand the ecology that may source potential conflicts of 
interest in other fields and contexts. This points to the imperative for open, ongoing, re-
flective and honest conversations across disciplinary lines to promote mutual understand-
ing of such potential conflicts of interest in different research fields and contexts, and 
thereby enabling such to be interrogated as necessary to avoid the potential bias that 
might otherwise arise. 
 
 
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN PROFESSIONAL CONTEXTS 
 
In this next part of the article I look at the nature of COI in two specific professional 
contexts – first, the medical professional setting and secondly, within the legal profession. 
The purpose of this discussion is to highlight potential differences in the way COI mani-
fest within these different professional contexts and, by analogy, in other professional 
contexts as well. This discussion builds on the first part of the paper to show that different 			
33  Albert F G Leentjens & James L Levenson, Ethical Issues Concerning the Recruitment of University Students 
as Research Subjects, 75 JOURNAL OF PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 394 (2013); Shirley K Comer, The Ethics 
of Conducting Educational Research on Your Own Students, 13 JOURNAL OF NURSING LAW 100 (2009); Emily 
M Bartholomay & Sarah K Sifers, Student Perception of Pressure in Faculty-Led Research, 50 LEARNING AND 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 302 (2016). 
34  Neil Lunt & Christa Fouché, Practitioner Research, Ethics and Research Governance, 4 ETHICS AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE 219, 227-228 (2010). 
35 Nadia von Benzon & Lorraine van Blerk, Research Relationships and Responsibilities: “Doing” Research with 
“Vulnerable” Participants, SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 7 (2017) doi: 10.1080/14649365.2017.1346199. 
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disciplinary and professional contexts source different types of conflicts of interest that 
are potentially perceived and understood through quite different lenses depending on a 
person’s intellectual and professional position and training. Accordingly it will infer that 
these differences influence the systems of belief and constructs that varied professionals 
utilise and draw on, when they are called to consider potential conflicts of interest outside 
their specific professional practice or setting. 
 
B. Non-medical Research 
 
For medical professionals, 
 
[t]he primary professional interest of each physician should be “to care for and 
protect the interests and wellbeing of patients to the best of that physician’s abil-
ities, while making sure her or his abilities are maintained as new discoveries are 
made.”36 Physicians assume a variety of roles as they pursue this primary interest, 
for example, patient care, research and innovation, education, guideline develop-
ment, public and population health, administration, policy formulation, or ad-
vocacy. Each of these roles brings with it specific personal secondary interests, 
such as competition for patients and trainees, extramural research funding, or 
high-profile publications, and financial compensation. External relationships 
with for-profit businesses create additional secondary interests, for example, hon-
orarium, royalties, equity, and sponsorship.37 
 
It is clear that COI can variously manifest in the work of a medical professional and in the 
context of medical practice. However, there are two broad obligations and responsibilities 
for the medical professional that I will focus on which may often give rise to potential 
COI - ensuring patient care, and formulating clinical practice guidelines. 
 
1. Anti-corruption campaign 
 
Patients “rely on the independence and trustworthiness of doctors for any advice or treat-
ment offered”.38 There is a fiduciary relationship between doctors and their patients, and 
the presence of COI could influence the practitioner to make decisions which adversely 
impact on patient well-being and outcomes, wastefully increase health care costs, or oth-
erwise contribute to a loss of trust in the health care system.39  			
36  William W Stead, The Complex and Multifaceted Aspects of Conflicts of Interest, 317 JOURNAL OF THE AMER-
ICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1765 (2017) citing Catherine D DeAngelis, Medical Professionalism, 313 JOUR-
NAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1837 (2015). 
37  Stead, supra at 1765. 
38  Medical Board of Australia, GOOD MEDICAL PRACTICE: A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR DOCTORS IN AUS-
TRALIA 21 (Mar., 2014), http://www.medicalboard.gov.au/Codes-Guidelines-Policies/Code-of-conduct.aspx. 
39  Christopher Robertson, Susannah Rose & Aaron S Kesselheim, Effect of Financial Relationships on the Be-
haviour of Health Care Professionals: A Review of the Evidence, 3 THE JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE AND 
ETHICS 452 (2012). 
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One well-known source of COI for medical practitioners is links with the pharmaceutical 
industry, which invests billions annually on strategies to influence practitioners’ prescrip-
tion patterns.40 Such strategies include gift-giving, free samples, funding for conference 
travel, funding for conference presentations and continuing education programs, hono-
raria, and marketing in both medical journals and the lay press. It is not only practising 
physicians, but also trainees, which are the subject of these overtures from industry.41 The 
risk for patient care arises when the drug or device being prescribed is either expensive and 
ineffective, or (at worst) unsafe, resulting in the provision of care that is neither econom-
ically efficient nor in the patient’s best interests.42 Similarly, in some jurisdictions such as 
in the US, different fee structures for treating physicians, as well as the availability of self-
referral to physician-owned or –affiliated businesses, can also result in the recommenda-
tion of unnecessary and expensive treatment for the patient.  
 
In addition to the previously discussed human research dimension, medical practitioners’ 
involvement in encouraging and facilitating patient participation in human research, 
where patients may be subjected to unproven and potentially dangerous therapies, is a 
prominent COI issue. The practitioner’s interest is in fulfilling publication requirements, 
clinical service development by obtaining access to new technology prior to competitor 
hospitals, and research program development by generating the income associated with 
study conduct.43 However, in the US and Canada, these secondary interests have led prac-
titioners to “[engage] in excessive ‘enrolment activities’ in exchange for money … [includ-
ing] perpetrated fraud, falsifying their recruitment records in order to increase their prof-
its. Others ignored exclusion criteria designed to ensure the safety of subjects and the va-
lidity of research results, referring their patients to research investigating treatments for 
conditions from which they did not suffer”.44 In such cases of wilful disregard for patient 
health and safety, the practitioners’ breach of their obligations to ensure their patients 
receive the proper care is particularly egregious: 
 
The vulnerability of a doctor’s own patients to become an experimental research 
subject because of their trust in their doctor, combined with the signing bonuses 
which the doctor pockets for the referral, sets up a toxic situation where some 
			
40  Neena Chappell et al., Conflict of Interest in Pharmaceutical Policy Research: An Example from Canada, 21 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH GOVERNANCE 66, 69 (2016); Moses Hamilton III et al., The Anat-
omy of Medical Research: US and International Comparisons 313 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION 174 (2015). 
41  Marissa King & Peter S Bearman, Gifts and Influence: Conflicts of Interest Policies and Prescribing of Psycho-
tropic Medications in the United States, 172 SOCIAL SCIENCE & MEDICINE 153 (2017); Chappell et al, supra at 
69 (2016); Id. at 45; Hampson & Montie, supra. 
42  Robertson, supra.  
43  Aine Donovan & Aaron V Kaplan, Navigating Conflicts of Interest for the Medical Device Entrepreneur, 55 
PROGRESS IN CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES 316, 318 (2012).  
44  Lemmens & Miller, supra at 132. 
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doctors are literally selling their own patients into human experiments.45 
 
Lemmens and Miller noted another corollary of conflict between practitioners’ financial 
interests and those of their patients in receiving timely medical care.  
 
Particularly when access to care is scarce and waiting lists are significant, finder’s 
fees can greatly exacerbate access issues, overburdening those physicians who 
have chosen not to spend a large proportion of their time recruiting patients and 
filling out forms against considerable payment. The phenomenon raises justice 
concerns, both insofar as the financial interests hamper patient access to care, and 
insofar as the burdens of providing that care may become unequally distributed 
among members of the profession.  
 
[…] 
 
When waiting lists for treatment are long, the prospect of participation in re-
search often becomes a tempting route to care for anxious patients. Physicians 
involved in remunerative recruitment may be tempted to suggest to patients that 
research participation will give them faster access to care. In such circumstances, 
one of the core principles of research ethics is compromised – nearly, that which 
requires research subjects’ consent to participation to be free from undue influ-
ence or coercion. 
 
However, studies into the attitudes of patients and the general public towards practition-
ers’ COIs do not support the position that they universally, or even mostly, consider prac-
titioners’ COI unethical or unfavourable. DiPaola et al. (2014), Yi et al. (2015), and Yi et 
al. (2016) all found that participants were largely unconcerned about connections with 
industry, provided that the practitioner disclosed the conflict to his or her patients; in 
other words, participants considered disclosure the most important means of self-regula-
tion and COI management. 46 Would the public or clients of other professional services 
take a similar view to such conflicts of interest that arise in other professional contexts, 
outside the medical profession? Or do public perceptions about doctors’ COI of them-
selves point to an inherent imbalance in how society views medical professionals and the 
status doctors are accorded, which perhaps evidence a source of potential COI in societal 
relationships with doctors, worthy of greater recognition and recourse? 
 
2. Clinical Practice Guidelines 			
45  Id. at 138, citing U.S., National Institutes of Health, Conference on Human Subject Protection and Financial 
Conflicts of Interest (conference transcript) 45 (2000). 
46  Christian P DiPaola et al., Surgeon-Industry Conflict of Interest: Survey of North Americans’ Opinions Regard-
ing Surgeons Consulting with Industry 14 THE SPINE JOURNAL 584 (2014); Paul H Yi et al., Are Financial 
Conflicts of Interest for the Surgeon a Source of Concern for the Patient?, JOURNAL OF ARTHROPLASTY 
21(2015); Paul H Yi et al., Patient Attitudes Toward Orthopedic Surgeon Ownership of Related Ancillary Busi-
nesses 31 JOURNAL OF ARTHROPLASTY 1635 (2016). 
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The Institute of Medicine defines clinical practice guidelines as “systematically developed 
statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate healthcare for 
specific clinical circumstances”.47 Such guidelines “are considered one of the most im-
portant services that medical societies provide. Guidelines serve a unique role to standard-
ize care, define quality of care, and are used in malpractice cases”.48  
 
In the development of clinical practice guidelines, the influence of the intellectual COI of 
committee experts who work on the guidelines have been touted; however, industry also 
helps to define new diseases and determine ‘best practices’ for treating them, usually 
through their connections with the deciding experts.49 Various studies have been con-
ducted on the frequency of COI whether financial or nonfinancial, disclosed or undis-
closed, amongst those on the relevant committees.50 This research underscores that there 
is a strong connection between experts in medical fields highlighting that “[t]he lack of 
disclosure of COI raises significant issues regarding the transparency and validity of the 
guideline development process”51 … and more generally emphasises that “transparency re-
garding any untold influences is critical”.52  
 
B. Non-medical Research 
 
The legal profession has arguably adopted a more clearly defined view of what constitutes 
a conflict of interest than has the medical profession. There is seemingly less interest in 
the legal professional context in distinguishing between different types of COI. This can 
generally be seen in the way that conflicts of interest are described and characterised in 
legal professional conduct rules and other legal professional statements across many juris-
dictions. 
 
Conflicts between the interests of clients, whether current or former, may prevent a law-
yer from acting for one of the parties. In the case of former clients, this proscription 
against acting for a client in conflict with a former client’s interests is mostly concerned 
			
47  Lo and Field, supra.  
48  Joseph D Feuerstein et al., Systematic Analysis of the Quality of the Scientific Evidence and Conflicts of Interest 
in Osteoarthritis of the Hip and Knee Practice Guidelines, 45 SEMINARS IN ARTHRITIS AND RHEUMATISM 
379, 382 (2016); see also Lisa Cosgrove et al., Conflict of Interest Policies and Industry Relationships of Guideline 
Development Group Members: A Cross-Sectional Study of Clinical Practice Guidelines for Depression, 24 AC-
COUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 99 (2017). 
49  Chappell et al., supra at 69; Akl supra. 
50  Susan L Norris et al, Authors’ Specialty and Conflicts of Interest Contribute to Conflicting Guidelines for Screen-
ing Mammography, 65 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 725, 731 (2012); Feuerstein et al., supra; Cos-
grove et al., supra. 
51  Feuerstein et al., supra at 384. 
52  Chappell et al., supra at 69; Akl supra. 
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with protecting their confidentiality, rather than constituting a continuing conflict of in-
terest.53  In large firms, where the former and current clients whose interests are in conflict 
are represented by different lawyers, ‘information barriers’ have been devised as an imper-
fect solution to quarantine information and prevent the former client’s confidentiality 
from being compromised. 54 
 
Beyond these client-centric categories, lawyers have also long been recognised as having 
duties to the profession and society more broadly.55 However, where these duties conflict 
with clients’ interests, “appeals to one or more of these values can often be used to justify 
the violation of another”; specifically, “the importance of client confidentiality, attorney-
client privilege, adherence to the wishes of their client, and the norm of zealous advocacy” 
may be used to override the laws of ethics.56  
 
It has been suggested that legal professionals owe a higher duty of loyalty, including 
greater duties of avoidance and disclosure, than other professional groups. Theories have 
been proposed as to why this is appropriate; writing in the context of the modern Amer-
ican legal system, Witkin wrote: 
 
While doctors are entrusted with their patients' lives and psychologists are en-
trusted with their clients' deepest secrets, legal professionals are unique in that 
they assist one individual who is faced with the collective power of society em-
bodied in the state. The clash between individual rights and such social regula-
tion forges a unique relationship between legal professional and client. Serving 
one person against the collective whole demands a key virtue from legal profes-
sionals: loyalty. … [W]orking in a system of rules that bind and potentially coerce 
the client demands an elevated duty of loyalty from the professional. 
[…] 
[A] system of binding laws poses a variety of practical reasons for its experts to 
promise undivided loyalty to clients. First, people with legal problems may act 
less on their understanding of the complicated structure of laws and procedures 
and more on a sense of fairness that is enhanced through the guidance of a loyal 
advocate. Next, experts in law represent individuals against adverse interests in 
society and must thereby address morally ambiguous situations. The simple ethic 
of loyalty to clients thereby allows legal experts to navigate these subjective di-
lemmas, provide uniform representation as part of a fair and balanced system, 
and rely on the adversarial court system to sort out truth and justice. Finally, the 			
53  YSAIAH ROSS & PETER MACFARLANE, ETHICS, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LEGAL PRACTICE 
346 (2017). 
54  Id. at 357. 
55  Nathan Witkin, Dependent Advocacy: Alternatives to Independence between Attorneys, 32 OHIO STATE JOUR-
NAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 111, 124 (2017). 
56  Jennifer K Robbennolt, Behavioural Ethics Meets Legal Ethics, 11 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 75, 78 (2015). 
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promise of loyalty promotes the use and quality of legal services. While the same 
could be said for any service or business, the promise of loyalty is especially im-
portant in the context of binding legal systems because clients may be mistrustful 
of legal experts who work within a system that may exert coercive force over the 
client.57 
 
There have been suggestions that the medical profession could (and should) adopt the 
legal profession’s stricter approach towards outlining and proscribing certain COI. Spe-
cifically, this would involve recognising the “fundamental ethical principle” of loyalty and 
trust between practitioner and patient, and requiring both disclosure and the acquisition 
of informed consent before the practitioner is permitted to pursue the conflicting inter-
est: 
 
Attorneys’ focused conversations about conflict are a far cry from the “disclo-
sures” we find in health care. An oblique reference in a consent form for treat-
ment or research may say “Dr. X’s research is funded by Company Y,” or “Dr. A 
is part owner of this facility and you are free to use the facility of your choice,” or 
“As a prospective patient of Y Medical Center, we are pleased to inform you that 
this hospital is partly owned by physicians.” The patient is virtually never told 
that the ownership represents a conflict of interest, or that the conflict directly 
threatens his or her interests. Neither is he or she asked to provide a special con-
sent expressly for the conflict of interest. 58 
 
At the very least this discussion has highlighted that medical and legal professional ethics 
and duties construct conflicts of interest in ways that give rise to points of divergence. 
This suggests that perhaps medical professionals will view potential conflicts of interest 
in different terms than lawyers; so then, when lawyers and doctors/clinicians are brought 
together on cross-disciplinary committees or boards and asked to make decisions that re-
quire consideration of conflicts of interest there is a real likelihood that they will do so 
from distinctly different points of reference. The implications of this needs careful con-
sideration particularly when one professional voice is likely to dominate or mute the other 
due to unequal representation or influence in any given context. This applies equally to 
other professional groups represented on institutional and organisational cross-discipli-
nary and professional committees and boards. 
 
 
V. POLITICAL CULTURE DIFFERENCE 
 
Conflicts of interest may take a myriad of forms with far reaching potential to impact on 
			
57  Witkin, supra at 119–20. 
58  Morreim, supra at 34. 
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professionally related decision-making. This article has highlighted that even highly qual-
ified professionals trained in ethical decision-making and bound by professional ethical 
guidelines and frameworks, may not fully recognise the impact of potential conflicts of 
interest in their activities, particularly when such activities involve decision-making out-
side the confines of their actual professional practice or specific disciplinary context e.g. 
clinicians or legal practitioners who are engaged on institutional ethics committees or 
other organisational committees or boards may unwittingly harbour professional biases 
in their decisions.  
The article has argued that conflicts of interest may indeed be rendered invisible by en-
trenched professional or disciplinary values and cultures that unquestionably accept the 
benevolence and status of a profession, its activities and ethics. Such conflicts of interests 
are arguably further rendered immune to identification and interrogation, as often those 
outside particular professional or disciplinary circles will not understand the nature of 
professional relationships, drivers, incentives and identity. Whilst the value of cross-disci-
plinary and professional committees, panels and boards is obvious, the potential for con-
flicts of interest to unconsciously influence decisions of such entities may be less apparent 
and needs to be vented. The very constituency and perhaps mosaic homogeneity and het-
erogeneity in the character of such groups, may perhaps perversely mask potential con-
flicts of interest and unwittingly reinforce bias in important decision-making, and thereby 
ironically be doing so under the guise of promoting ethical decision making and ethical 
practices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
November 2006: 200 police officers make their way toward central Munich. Their goal: 
the head office of a large German DAX company. Their suspicion: corruption, bribery, 
deception. Suspicion quickly turns into certainty – the first detentions take place in De-
cember and in March 2007, an active executive board of a DAX Group is arrested for the 
first time. The investigations drag on, more and more responsible parties land in a swamp 
made up of bribery payments, corruption, and dirty transactions – more than a billion 
euros have disappeared into dark channels. The press writes about mafia-style situations, 
the company’s image is damaged. 
But the new top management of the Group wants to clean things up: a Compliance Of-
ficer is appointed, with more than 600 employees reporting to him, who are to expose 
and prevent statutory violations within the company.  All is expected to be well again. 
 
July 2017: once again, the Group hits the headlines. Some of the Group’s products have 
turned up in an area where no products are allowed to be delivered due to the current 
political situation and imposed sanctions. Group management talks about having been 
“deceived”, while others assert that Group management knew very well where the prod-
ucts were destined to go, but relied on the silence of the buyer. 
 
An everyday case, which shows: the temptation is always there – the rules are clear, but 
the behavior still violates them. The motive: in this case, money. 
Compliance means that companies and organizations fulfill their legal obligations and 
comply with internal standards. It thus becomes a matter of ensuring that all employees 
comply with the legal and commercial traffic regulations. Employee training, referrals to 
rights and regulations, and possible sanctions stand on the side of the potential imple-
mentation of regulations. 
Time and again, revealed instances of rule violations at large companies end up catapult-
ing the topic of compliance to the top of the agenda. Then – depending on the size of the 
company – a whole host of judges are appointed as compliance managers with the task of 
ensuring law and order in the actions of the company employees. 
The idea behind the compliance approach is to strengthen control and intensify the pen-
alties for violations, where applicable, so that the rule violation results in significant losses, 
which surpass the supposed benefit of the rule violation, such that the risk of such a rule 
violation is no longer lucrative. Such a perspective is extrinsically motivated. 
 
Another point of view is the Integrity Perspective, prominently formulated by Lynn 
Sharp Paine back in the mid-90’s, which has meanwhile been academically received and 
discussed many times. The Integrity Perspective posits a counterpoint: it takes the posi-
tion that managers and employees are independently concerned with compliance due to 
inner convictions – because they live the spirit of standards due to their inner conviction. 
Integrity is based on one’s inner attitude (Greek: ethos). 
While one can conceivably assume with respect to Compliance Orientation that for the 
overwhelming majority the respective compliance with rules and standards can be con-
veyed through sanctions, in the case of integrity it pertains to the issue of whether ethos 
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as an inner attitude for a reflection of morals can be conveyed or whether it is an aimless 
undertaking, which is doomed to fail from the start, because humans are not receptive to 
it – to summarize this position: integrity is an attitude that one either has or does not 
have. It is molded in the first two decades of one’s life, during which the inner attitude 
and the inner value structure slowly take shape. 
II. COMPLIANCE AND INTEGRITY: AN ANCIENT DEBATE 
 
The question is whether this argument can be supported. If it were true, it would have 
direct implications on the issue of whether employees at all hierarchy levels of a company 
are able to learn integrity in general, or whether the attempt can only be achieved on the 
extrinsically oriented compliance side, i.e. via (also positive) sanctioning. 
Interestingly enough, this goes right back into the middle of an age-old debate, which de-
scribes the hour of birth of ethics: for the verifiable written history of ethics begins with 
Socrates (469 to 399 BC) and his student Plato (427 to 347 BC) – the fragments of the so-
called Pre-Socratics are hardly systematic contributions to ethics. At the time of Socrates, 
there was a doctrinal conflict between himself and Plato on one hand, and the opinion 
leaders of philosophy at that time, the sophists, on the other hand. The point of conten-
tion was: can one teach virtue and morals as one teaches math and spelling – this would 
be the compliance approach today – or must this capacity for good actions derive sponta-
neously (of one’s own accord) and from one’s own knowledge – which today is known 
by the key word “integrity”. 
The sophists, roving migrant philosophers, approached the issue pragmatically: practical 
issues of ethics were a decisive factor for them. The sophists believed that one could easily 
teach people virtue, specifically to the degree they benefit from it. For they were convinced 
that there was no universally valid, objective virtue doctrine, but rather that virtue is al-
ways a subjective matter for each individual. According to the sophists, virtue was not an 
objective commodity, which one can approach with the aid of self-awareness, asceticism, 
theoretical debate or the like, but rather a teachable ability such as the art of speaking or 
mathematics. The sophists believed that no values or virtues were valid by nature, i.e. ob-
jectively valid. The sophists’ thinking was therefore also characterized by relativism and 
skepticism. 
They were skeptical to the extent that they did not believe in an absolute truth. Values 
and virtues arise based on the positing by man. They believed that virtues had a different 
validity at different times and at different places, depending on the agreement reached 
among people and as it is beneficial to them. 
 
Socrates and Plato were of a different opinion: they assumed that there was an objective 
form of knowledge, in particular of [that which is] good. Goodness, therefore, and the 
capacity to act according to goodness cannot be taught, but one must instead come to an 
understanding of what is truly – and objectively – good from his own incentive, through 
reflection and contemplation, and act accordingly. 
Socrates assumed being able to arrive at a good life by way of self-awareness. Socrates was 
convinced that every person has within himself the capacity to recognize good; according 
to Socrates, one can identify the hidden virtues through skillful questioning, for oneself, 
and for others, provided they can get involved in a philosophical discourse. 
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Socrates wanted to learn about the motif of an action from his dialog partners, and what 
values, conceptions and rules characterize the action. 
These values must also be scrutinized again, says Socrates, and he was not satisfied with 
simple, superficial answers. If one continues to question, then one finds out that which is 
the true good, and how one implements it in the world. 
Socrates perfected this process of continual self-awareness in the dialogues that his student 
Plato wrote down: in response to every statement of his dialogue partner, Socrates at-
taches a new question, pushing the stake of knowledge deeper and deeper into the mind 
of the counterpart. At the end of the dialogue, both dialogue partners have at times come 
a good step further, but sometimes not, and the readers at first lag behind in a state of 
confusion.  But Socrates’ questions in the dialogues are guided by interests, since the ob-
ject of the dialogues is that the dialogue partners – and that means the readers – ultimately 
arrive at the knowledge of themselves – from their own incentive.  Socrates serves as the 
midwife in the ever-new re-birth of self-awareness. That is why one speaks of maieutic in 
Socratic philosophy.  
Once one has understood what virtuous action is, one can – according to Socrates – act 
in accordance with it. In other words: true self-awareness, according to Socrates, is the 
prerequisite for virtuous actions. 
 
The idea of what is good is also the fundamental issue and guideline of Plato’s philosophy 
as well. Plato’s approach goes further than Socrates’ does, he thought in more abstract 
terms: the idea of what is good forms the basis not only for his ethics, but also for his 
entire philosophy. Plato begins by conceiving of ethics theoretically, for he poses the ques-
tion as to how the idea of what is good is acquired and how one can describe its repercus-
sions on people’s everyday life. The concrete actions of man are primarily secondary for 
him.  
Plato arrives at the doctrine of virtue by way of doctrine of the soul. Plato perceives three 
parts to the soul of humankind: the actual divine, reason, and the two parts that refer to 
the perception of the world: the higher part, courage, residing in the chest, and the lower 
[part], desire, residing in the belly. Plato allocates one virtue to each of these three parts 
of the soul: to reason the virtue of wisdom, to courage the virtue of bravery, and to desire 
the virtue of moderation. 
Plato places justice above these three virtues as the fourth cardinal virtue. Justice connects 
the first three and is at the same time the foundation and roof of the other three virtues. 
According to Plato, when all of the three other virtues are in balance with each other, man 
lives justly. In other words, none of the virtues may be over-emphasized, only through 
balance does one achieve a righteous life.  
 
The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 to 322 BC) represents an intermediate position in 
this dispute to a certain extent. To Aristotle, ethics is an academic discipline along with 
the doctrine of thought (logic) and the doctrine of nature (physics). Primarily in his books 
“Nicomachean Ethics” and “Politics”, Aristotle develops ethics – corresponding to the 
state of discussion at the time – as the doctrine of virtue. Ethics is therefore part of a prac-
tical philosophy because it deals with the application of knowledge to everyday life. In 
this way, Aristotle travels a path of ethics closer to life, in contrast to Plato who applied 
himself primarily to ethical theorizing. 
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According to Aristotle, ethics differs from logical philosophy in that it does not strive to-
ward knowledge for its own sake, but refers to the spirit and purpose in actual practice. 
By nature, states Aristotle, everyone strives toward Good, because it is there where he 
finds bliss.  
Aristoteles distinguishes two types of virtues: one being the dianoetic (Greek for relating 
to reason) virtues, and the other being the ethical (Greek for relating to habit) virtues. 
According to Aristotle, the dianoetic virtues are perceptible through reason, while the 
ethical virtues can already be found in tradition, in political order, in togetherness. Man 
must grapple with them and practice them by means of familiarization (thus the name 
ethical!). In other words: there are virtues that are derived from knowledge and there are 
virtues that result from practicing certain actions. 
To determine the ethical virtues one must be clear, according to Aristotle, as to the con-
text in which one understands actions. It therefore deals with delimiting the actual frame-
work within which people act and desist from action. Aristotle finds this concrete space 
for his ethics in the polis (Greek for city-state), the Athenian city-state at that time.  
Fundamentally, Aristotle goes the way of the aurea mediocritas (Latin for the happy me-
dium) in his doctrine of virtue, i.e. the middle path between the extremes. Virtues such as 
competence, strength and capability, as well as aptitude for good actions never reach im-
balance according to Aristotle, but rather seek balance in the middle. 
 
What results from this – granted very rough — description of positions? 
 
1. The first position assumes that morals can be taught, that they can be “brought 
home” to people, to express it in modern terms, in the form of a service. The 
sophists were not only convinced of this, but they also earned money by means 
of it. Depending on the external rule, the internal attitude, virtue, adapts and 
does what complies with the rule. Expressed in modern terms: the internal atti-
tude complies with the law – in a certain form of the antique compliance ap-
proach. 
 
2. The second position purports that virtue and morals must come from man 
himself; while surely it is possible to further this self-awareness process through 
questions and suggestions, but it is not really teachable, says Socrates. That would 
be the puristic integrity approach, which at the same time would assert that cor-
rect behavior, correct attitude can only be achieved through inner attitude and 
conviction; training and instructions on it would thus also lose their significance, 
because the motivation is intrinsic, through and through. 
 
3. The third position, Aristotle, in turn starts with the existence of virtues, which 
can be perceived with the head and the heart: to pursue the middle course, which 
presumes making an active decision, reflecting on the conduct of life, i.e. ethics. 
This can be learned through experience and reason, for everything by nature 
strives for Good. This approach appears to be a useful portal for leaving the two 
one-sided positions and resort to a reality-oriented middle course.  
 
This third position can be used to put the compliance-integrity topic in a broader context, 
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because integrity culture can only be lived in an organization if it resorts to this middle 
course, without falling into one of the two extremes (solely compliance or solely integrity 
orientation). Furthermore: the theoretical approach behind it opens up a new perspective 
on the debate. That is because this debate on the integrity of an enterprise is in fact only 
pursued most eagerly if a company and/or decision makers in businesses and politics are 
caught in misconduct. 
 
III. INTEGRITY CULTURE AS A PROACTIVE STRATEGY 
 
Another method of approach is presented below. With the aid of a subsequently de-
scribed practical example, the process as to how the integrity approach can be imple-
mented within an organization as a basis for a forward-looking strategy is explained. Nei-
ther an offense nor an infringement need be the impetus for Integrity Management, but 
the integrity approach can help implement the strategic goals of company management. 
Development of an integrity culture need not be defined as a response to a misdemeanor 
or a catastrophic event of any kind, but rather offers the possibility of a proactive change 
process, which can help provide an enterprise with more market security and strategic ori-
entation. 
The starting point for thoughts on developing a proactive integrity strategy is the St. 
Gallen Management Triangle: in an organization, strategy needs structure and culture to 
support it. In competing for customers and talent, companies and organizations want to 
win the hearts of people with their products or services. To this end, it is important to 
know where the heart of the company or organization beats. Values and attitudes, the 
culture of an organization, are supporting pillars alongside the structure and organization, 
enabling strategic corporate goals to be implemented. Strategic goals and performances 
are only effective if the employees direct their activities, day after day, toward implement-
ing the strategic goals and driving forward the strategy. It’s about the character of the or-
ganization. This is where proactive Integrity Management begins. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: „The St. Gallen Management Triangle“ 
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To form culture and values within an organization, which are a component of solid In-
tegrity Management, it is important to broaden one’s view. For values go deeper into the 
character of an organization: when it comes to values – in the initial approach at least – it 
is necessary to distinguish between intangible assets (truth, trust, love, etc.) and tangible 
assets (money, house, etc.). 
Ethically relevant values that a person brings with him/her depend on origin, education 
and character. They are a subjective commodity suitable to the times, the maintenance, 
care and outward explicitness of which always lie within the intrinsic motivation of the 
subject and in certain circumstances are not affected by external rules, measures or ap-
peals. That is, in case of doubt it is possible that extraneous laws, appeals and rules within 
an organization may not even be perceived by individual employees in the organization, 
may not really get through to the attitude of this or that individual, because the inner 
attitude of the person does not hold the door open to receive them. 
 
The goal of Integrity Management as a proactive strategy approach is that employees of 
all levels contribute to the overall value of the enterprise based on intrinsic motivation. It 
is therefore a question of linking economic values to intangible, ethical values; it is not a 
question of pitting them against each other.   
Integrity Management defined as a proactive strategy factor strives to entrench intangible 
assets in the company, into the corporate strategy, and view them as an asset, as a positive 
value, with which the employees can identify. It pertains to the character of an organiza-
tion, which distinguishes it from others - in times, in which VUKA characterizes the en-
vironment of organizations and the employees working there, a market advantage not to 
be underestimated! 
 
 
IV. INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT AS A PROACTIVE STRATEGY FACTOR PAYS 
OFF IN THE MEDIUM TERM 
 
Managerial and value-oriented, integrated behavior should mutually complement each 
other. They should be complementarily aligned and in this way contribute to the success 
of a company. Consultants and managers and their female counterparts often make a dis-
tinction between hard and soft success factors.  
Hard success factors in this totally questionable explanation include measurable success 
figures such as market leadership, key strategy, strategy implementation and control, mar-
keting, specialization, closeness to the customer, solid partnerships, high level of innova-
tion, quality products and service, organizational structure, production technology, re-
source availability, etc. 
By contrast, the so-called soft success factors are described as those, which at first glance 
cannot be measured in figures, such as employee identification and motivation, openness 
to innovations, listening to customers, corporate culture, time management, authentic 
leadership styles, management quality, mission statement, codes of conduct, etc. 
According to this classic division, work on the integrity of an organization would be a so-
called soft factor, since the topic has to do with mission statements, motivation and iden-
tification, and not with controlling, marketing or product management. At the same 
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time, the question arises as to whether the division into hard factors (because they are 
supposedly directly measurable) and soft factors (because they are supposedly not directly 
measureable) actually makes sense. 
There are good reasons to abandon this classification, because the so-called hard factors 
depend on the soft factors and vice versa. Closeness to the Customer, quality assurance, 
and strategy pertain to how strongly employees identify with the company. Production 
processes on paper and optimally organized with the help of consultants will not cut it if 
the employees do not go along with them. The most stringent rules and controls, be they 
on the part of the state, or be they internal within the company, do not help at all if the 
employees do not wish to comply with them from within themselves – see also the exam-
ple at the beginning, see also our individual behavior in road traffic for example: the rules 
here are happily transcended or stretched, because presumably one’s subjective perception 
describes a different relationship than that which would objectively make more sense for 
all. 
In other words, it is obvious that there are key figures and success factors, which are of an 
objective nature and can be quickly calculated based on formulas and specifications, 
which can then also be compared and show developments such as trends. Another obvi-
ous fact is that without culture, which helps carry these structures and strategies, it is 
simply impossible. 
The service provider, a company with about 750 employees, had been through various 
changes at the management level in 2013, and even the chairperson of the board was newly 
appointed. The new leadership developed and completed a new future strategy in a rela-
tively short period of time, as to how they wanted to position themselves as a market 
leader in the industry, although in a market that had become ever more competitive over 
the years. The strategy was initially developed internally, and then further developed dur-
ing sparring with external consultants. The sparring with external consultants in particu-
lar led the company to a considerable re-sharpening of the strategic goals, since the exter-
nal consultants consistently kept an eye on the internal implementation and could thus 
keep the strategy free of meaningless generalizations. At the end of this process, which 
lasted about a year, the strategy was complete with vision, mission statement, values of 
the organization and strategic departmental goals. Partial goals for the year 2014 were de-
rived from these goals and put into effect. 
 
It quickly became apparent to the leadership group, however, that the simple adoption 
and announcement of the strategy internally was not enough; for while the employees 
received the strategy delivered in a nice glossy format, and many reported that they had 
read it, no one knew exactly how much any individual employee had understood and in-
ternalized. It was assumed that in the beginning this was only true for a few employees, 
and not because the employees had not been intellectually capable of it, but rather because 
in the strategic goals of the company, the actual meaning and way to implement them in 
the everyday activities of each employee were not evident enough. The cultural anchoring 
was missing.  
The strategy was firm, but what that meant for activities in the workplace of the employ-
ees in customer contact, in service, in internal administration, was not clear, because there 
was no intrinsic motivation to implement the strategic goals in the everyday activities of 
one’s own accord. 
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After company management caught on to this realization, the culture of the enterprise 
was given a closer look. Central questions were: 
To what extent does the internal culture support the new strategy and goals? 
What type of attitude, what type of culture, what character do we need as an organization, 
so that the employees can actually go along with the strategy? 
What do we need to do to get the internal culture to practice the strategic guidelines 
within the meaning of an integral attitude? 
 
The fact that this is a profoundly corporate cultural issue was obvious to the management 
group, while it was also clear that culture and the intrinsic attitude of the employees of 
the organization cannot be decreed, but must develop from mutual cooperation. For this 
reason, company management turned the spotlight on a number of questions:  
Where can the Integrity Management as an organization have access to resources? 
In what direction should the Integrity Management be further developed in order to 
breathe life into the strategy? 
Where does the organization need intrinsically motivated employees who also pay atten-
tion to compliance with the strategic guidelines, in order to advance the entire enterprise? 
 
To that end, the company management, together with external consultants, established 
the process of „Strategy-oriented Culture Development (STOKE for short). With this 
strategy-oriented culture development, the organization struck a new path. The evolved 
culture of the organization should be consciously perceived and subsequently reflected 
how as an Integrity Management it supports the goals and strategy of the entire organiza-
tion. It pertained to a conscious development of the intrinsic motivation for culture in 
terms of the strategy according to the St. Gallen Management Triangle: Integrity as a pro-
active strategy factor.  
V. A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE: FRAMEWORK AND INITIAL SITUATION 
 
The service provider, a company with about 750 employees, had been through various 
changes at the management level in 2013, and even the chairperson of the board was newly 
appointed. The new leadership developed and completed a new future strategy in a rela-
tively short period of time, as to how they wanted to position themselves as a market 
leader in the industry, although in a market that had become ever more competitive over 
the years. The strategy was initially developed internally, and then further developed dur-
ing sparring with external consultants. The sparring with external consultants in particu-
lar led the company to a considerable re-sharpening of the strategic goals, since the exter-
nal consultants consistently kept an eye on the internal implementation and could thus 
keep the strategy free of meaningless generalizations. At the end of this process, which 
lasted about a year, the strategy was complete with vision, mission statement, values of 
the organization and strategic departmental goals. Partial goals for the year 2014 were de-
rived from these goals and put into effect. 
 
It quickly became apparent to the leadership group, however, that the simple adoption 
and announcement of the strategy internally was not enough; for while the employees 
received the strategy delivered in a nice glossy format, and many reported that they had 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 2   2017 
DANIEL DIETZFELBINGER   |  INTEGRITY CULTURE AS A FORWARD-LOOKING SUCCESS FACTOR: A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE 
 
PAGE  63 
read it, no one knew exactly how much any individual employee had understood and in-
ternalized. It was assumed that in the beginning this was only true for a few employees, 
and not because the employees had not been intellectually capable of it, but rather because 
in the strategic goals of the company, the actual meaning and way to implement them in 
the everyday activities of each employee were not evident enough. The cultural anchoring 
was missing.  
The strategy was firm, but what that meant for activities in the workplace of the employ-
ees in customer contact, in service, in internal administration, was not clear, because there 
was no intrinsic motivation to implement the strategic goals in the everyday activities of 
one’s own accord. 
After company management caught on to this realization, the culture of the enterprise 
was given a closer look. Central questions were: 
 
• To what extent does the internal culture support the new strategy and 
goals? 
• What type of attitude, what type of culture, what character do we need 
as an organization, so that the employees can actually go along with the 
strategy? 
• What do we need to do to get the internal culture to practice the strategic 
guidelines within the meaning of an integral attitude? 
 
The fact that this is a profoundly corporate cultural issue was obvious to the management 
group, while it was also clear that culture and the intrinsic attitude of the employees of 
the organization cannot be decreed, but must develop from mutual cooperation. For this 
reason, company management turned the spotlight on a number of questions:  
 
• Where can the Integrity Management as an organization have access to 
resources? 
• In what direction should the Integrity Management be further devel-
oped in order to breathe life into the strategy? 
• Where does the organization need intrinsically motivated employees 
who also pay attention to compliance with the strategic guidelines, in 
order to advance the entire enterprise? 
 
To that end, the company management, together with external consultants, established 
the process of „Strategy-oriented Culture Development (STOKE for short). With this 
strategy-oriented culture development, the organization struck a new path. The evolved 
culture of the organization should be consciously perceived and subsequently reflected 
how as an Integrity Management it supports the goals and strategy of the entire organiza-
tion. It pertained to a conscious development of the intrinsic motivation for culture in 
terms of the strategy according to the St. Gallen Management Triangle: Integrity as a pro-
active strategy factor. 
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VI. THE ROUGH FRAMEWORK: APPROACH, GOALS AND CONDITIONS 
 
How was that tackled? First of all, the present culture was taken into consideration and 
analyzed. The objective was to clarify, which cultural values and attitudes support the new 
strategy of the entire organization and which ones stand in the way. Building upon this, 
a target culture was to be defined, with which the entire organization goes along. The 
target culture had a strong characteristic in reference to the integrity attitude of the em-
ployees. On that basis, certain measures were to implement the new culture into the or-
ganization. The goal was to reinforce a goal-based and reality-based culture, organized 
from the strategy itself, and breathe new life into it. 
 
The following points were essential in order to establish the long-term cultural develop-
ment within the organization for the medium term: 
 
• Comprehensive inclusion and participation of managers and employees. 
• Set an example from above, begin above and work across levels: execu-
tive board and managers as essential culture bearers, role models and am-
bassadors. 
• Resource-saving approach: use existing formats, platforms and processes 
in the organization. Play on existing stages, with new ones only where 
truly necessary. This strengthens the intrinsic motivation as well as the 
individual employees (familiarity!) 
• Emotional tangibility: interactive, illustrative and moving forms of com-
munication are established. 
 
Starting with these criteria, five phases were defined in view of the strategy-oriented cul-
ture development:  
• Phase 1: Take measurements with responsible parties. Which detailed 
steps serve the purpose and fit with the organization? 
• Phase 2: Analysis of the ACTUAL culture. Employees and managers dis-
cuss the existing culture with one another and summarize them in con-
crete examples, stories and images. 
• Phase 3: Develop the TARGET culture. The company management 
gathers the results and sets the framework for STROKE, guided by the 
questions: which culture carries the strategy? Which cultural resources 
are available? What do we need more of, what less?  
• Phase 4: Implementation of the TARGET culture. Alongside the strat-
egy and in the everyday work, the organization reflects the cultural weak-
nesses and strengths and develops concepts on how the culture can be 
strengthened and developed. 
• Phase 5: Transfer to the regulating processes of the company. Evaluation 
of the process completed to date. 
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Fig. 2: „Overview“ 
 
 
A. Phases 1 to 3 as inventories and new definition of the entrepreneurial charac-
ter of the organization 
 
The goals of Phase 1 were to develop the process plan for STROKE in coordination with 
the leadership team of the organization and create acceptance of the process through com-
municative inclusion of the employees. 
To this end, STROKE was presented at an employees’ meeting. The external consultants 
explained how the relationship between strategy, structure, and culture is to be inter-
preted, and identified the initial goals of the process. The relationship between extrinsic 
and intrinsic motivation was made clear, in order to clarify for the employees that it does 
not only pertain to the role of management, but that the employees themselves are ulti-
mately the deciding change agents and by means of their own methods of working and 
communication, contribute to the intrinsic motivation of the other employees as well. 
The strategic added value of a proactive integrity culture can be conveyed in this way. 
After determining the individual actors and their respective responsibilities, the key actors 
within this context were defined (works council, supervisory boards, etc.) and respective 
options were developed for these actors to participate in the in the ongoing process. In 
addition, the maturity level of the organization for this upcoming process was analyzed. 
Following this, kick-off workshops were held with the various actors, during which initial 
process ideas were presented and discussed. 
 
In Phase 2 the analysis of the ACTUAL culture based on an existing survey was on the 
agenda. In 2013 the organization conducted a detailed employee survey through another 
external consulting institute. Building upon this employee survey, the actual status of the 
culture and the awareness level for Integrity Management was ascertained. In workshops 
for employees, which were offered on a voluntary basis, the Actual culture was analyzed. 
Storytelling was used to make this specific. Employees were to talk about typical everyday 
examples for the culture, first in small groups, then in plenum and subsequently explain 
why these stories, these examples, and these cases are expressions of the current culture.   
During the process, some negative examples (but not only negative ones) came to light at 
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first, fully intentionally. This purging effect of the initial workshops is an important tran-
sitional phase for this type of process. That is because in order to detect what is working 
positively, and also detect what is not going so well, it is helpful to also take a look at the 
negative side and processes (but again, not exclusively!), which allegedly or actually are 
not going well. 
Another stage of the workshops was to ask the employees to depict their current percep-
tion of the organization in the form of a painted picture. This phase produced a number 
of hand-painted pictures of the organization, which reflected the culture in all its facets. 
This unit, which extended beyond storytelling, served the twofold purpose of uncovering 
the resources and development options in view of the culture in the organization and 
identifying the focal topics. 
 
In Phase 3, the goal was to develop the target culture. After the contours of the actual 
culture were clearly outlined, the point was to determine the orientation of culture devel-
opment and make it plausible. Phase 3 gathered the resources of the present culture and 
tied to good present practices. In doing so, it was important to keep in mind that the target 
culture is based on the strategy and supports the formulated values/goals. Moreover, the 
target culture being defined is intended to link to examples and pictures from Phase 2 and 
likewise show in activities, pictures and examples what will be strengthened, deepened 
and further developed in the future. Included here were strategically relevant projects and 
departments of the organization, the topics of which render the culture development and 
outlines of a future culture and Integrity Management concrete and tangible. 
First of all, in accordance with the hierarchy levels, management was questioned about 
the target culture in a workshop. This took place in an intensive discussion with examples 
and a history of the present, each referring to the strategic goals, in order to keep the nexus 
to the strategy current and present. These workshops were carried out across all levels of 
the organization. Invitations on a voluntary level reached approximately a third of the 
workforce. The results of each workshop were in charts and guiding principles, toward 
which the organization is expected to orient itself in the future with a view to strategy, 
brand, and culture. 
 
B. Two-day closed-door meeting of the responsible parties and employees’ as 
key points 
 
A two-day closed-door meeting took place at the end of the workshop series, in which 
selected employees (a feedback group formed at the beginning of the process) as well as 
the management team participated. In the closed meeting, the point was to summarize 
the guiding principles from the workshops, check them regarding their relatedness to the 
strategy and connect them to positive future narratives.  
This intensive work was one of the key points for redefining the integrity culture of the 
organization. The supposedly simple task of summarizing and correlating developed into 
a fundamental debate regarding the character and orientation of the organization. 
Subsequent to the closed meeting, the guiding principles were copyedited and – starting 
from the strategic goals – put into sequence. 
Two years from the beginning of the process with the initial announcement at the em-
ployees’ meeting, another special event occurred in the summer of 2016. The goal of the 
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event was to present the guiding principles to all of the employees on one hand, and ena-
ble them right then and there to engage in an initial discussion of the guiding principles 
during a brief encounter. The particular feature of the event was that it was not manage-
ment that presented the principles of the culture, but rather the employees who had fol-
lowed the process for two years in a feedback group. That brought necessary authenticity 
boost regarding acceptance, because that made it clear: they are guiding principles from 
the employees of the organization for the employees of the organization. 
After presenting the guiding principles, which were always highlighted with examples, all 
of the employees had the opportunity to discuss the guiding principles in an initial en-
counter in the form of a Woldcafé. 
 
C. Phase 4: Implementation in the Everyday Work World 
 
In Phase 4, finally implementation was to take effect:  the objective was to once again give 
all employees an understanding of the guiding principles in a half-day workshop and to 
derive measures from them that signified concrete implementation of the guiding princi-
ples for the respective areas of responsibility. First of all, general conditions and objectives 
of the implementation phase were set out in a management circle with all managers of the 
organization. Following this, workshops of at least a half-day took place within the de-
partments and teams in a cascade manner from top to bottom. The workshops were con-
ceptually designed so that the employees first embrace the guiding principles in depth, 
and from there take a look at which guiding principles the group is well positioned for 
(Resource view). Then, with an eye toward implementation of the guiding principles in 
the respective unit, identify any deficits. From these deficits (“Where is room for improve-
ments?”) two or a maximum of three topics are extracted, which the group will ultimately 
work on. The focus and framework here should be for one’s own arena (“mind your own 
business”), not the neighboring department or the neighboring team (“If they would only 
get on with it, then we could ...”). The assignment is to plan and name the actions that 
could be implemented in one’s own team, in one’s own department. To that end, target 
action plans were developed and responsible persons were designated for the actions in 
order to achieve sustained progress in the implementation. 
Conducting the action workshops was recorded in the target agreements for managers, so 
that sustainability could be achieved by means of target control. Since there were approx-
imately 70 workshops in total for the entire organization, the time period for execution 
was spread out over several months. 
 
D. The status today and the upcoming steps 
 
In the meantime, all units have conducted workshops and developed appropriate actions 
tailored to the units. The units are currently working out these actions, for which the time 
allotted is the end of 2017. This is also recorded in the target agreements for 2017, thus 
providing sustainability of implementation. 
Various supporting workshops are being offered by the consultants, which bolster the 
responsible parties for actions during implementation, and for obtaining feedback on 
their own actions via collegial consulting. 
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VII. SUMMARY 
 
In developing an Integrity Managements and supported by the external consultants, the 
organization links to the formulated strategy as well as to strengths and resources of the 
present culture. Awareness of examples of a developed culture already experienced results 
in an integral attitude for employees and therefore to an integrity orientation of the entire 
organization. In addition, the organization proceeds with a practical orientation: devel-
opment and communication of the culture in workshops, in which constitutive examples 
from practice are adopted and reflected upon with an eye toward solutions, so as to clarify, 
strengthen and develop the culture. 
 
This approach could catch on: Integrity Management not as a reaction to critical situa-
tions within an organization of any kind whatsoever, but rather as forward-looking stra-
tegic planning, which acknowledges Compliance Management as a necessary variable, but 
only a secondary controlling variable in corporate development. 
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I. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT IN 
CHINA 
 
A. The old landscape 
 
“Compliance” used to be a term that was mainly familiarized by managers and employees 
of foreign multinationals in China. People commonly understand the word “compliance” 
in the context of FCPA, which is the abbreviation of “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” and 
the abbreviation itself has successfully entered the Chinese language. 
FCPA compliance is the number one task for the compliance function of most foreign 
multinationals in China. The number of Chinese compliance professionals hired by for-
eign multinationals and the legal spending in compliance related investigations (both ex-
ternal and internal) have multiplied against the backdrop of heavy enforcement of US 
authorities since around 2008. According to the “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Clearing-
house”1, China is the location with the highest number of US FCPA enforcement actions 
between 2008 and 2017. 46 FCPA cases involves a bribery scheme inside China. In com-
parison, Gabon, the number two location on the list, has only 17 associated cases. 
Aside from foreign multinationals, there is a distinctive Chinese domestic industry that 
has familiarized the term compliance the financial industry. Banking, insurance and secu-
rities are three subsets of Chinese financial industry. Each of the three has its own industry 
regulator, namely China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (CIRC), and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
All three financial industry regulators have issued their “Guideline for Compliance Risk 
Management” for their respective sector2, which set a mandatory requirement for any fi-
nancial institutions in these three sectors to establish a compliance management program.  
The origin of the compliance requirement in the Chinese financial industry could be 
traced back to China’s accession to the Basel Global banking regulatory committee. In 
2005, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a high-level paper on compliance 
risk and compliance function in banks.3 Subsequently, CBRC, which is a member of the 
Basel Committee, adopted the concept and issued its compliance management guideline 
for Chinese banks. The core concept and wording of this guideline is largely in line with 
the Basel high level paper.  
For most Chinese domestic companies that are not part of the financial industry, until 
very recently, “Compliance” was not a common word in their vocabulary. Chinese com-
panies generally do not have a culture of compliance. Although Chinese central and local 
government as well as various ministries and government departments issued thousands 
of laws, regulations and guidelines, their enforcement are often selective. Chinese officials 			
1
  StanfordLawSchool, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Clearinghouse- a collaboration with Sullivan & Cromwell 
LLP (Aug. 30, 2017), http://fcpa.stanford.edu. 
2  China Banking Regulatory Commission, Guideline for the compliance risk management of commercial banks 
(Mar 1, 2005). 
3  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Compliance and the compliance function in banks (2005). 
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have large discretion in the law enforcement and their power are merely challenged by the 
judiciary. Violation of laws and regulations may not meet consequences as long as the 
business owner obtains good relationship with government officials. As a result, courting 
the government officials and cultivating a good relationship is more effective than the of-
ten too costly compliance management effort. 
 
B. The growing awareness of compliance 
 
There is however a sense of changing attitude towards compliance in the last few years. 
Chinese business leaders and government officials spoke out in many occasions on the 
importance of compliance. This growing awareness could be tied to a joint force of the 
change of political environment, intensified regulatory action, growing international ex-
pansion of Chinese companies, and strong advocacy from Chinese government. 
 
1. Anti-corruption campaign 
 
A far reaching anti-corruption campaign began in China following Chinese president Xi 
JingPing coming to power in late 2012. Over hundreds of high ranking government offi-
cials, including national political leaders, high-ranking military officers and senior execu-
tives of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), have since been removed and charged with al-
leged corruption. A much larger number of government officials with less higher rank 
were disciplined and indicted. The campaign has affected across the country leaving no 
industry or government brunch intact. 
The anti-corruption campaign has fundamentally changed the political environment in 
China. There is a general sense of insecurity among Chinese business leaders, as their pow-
erful patrons may suddenly fall from grace. Business owners and senior executives of both 
state-owned and private companies started to question their long- cultivated relationship 
with government officials, which may now turn into a liability that will implicate them 
to corruption charges. It is now easier to convince the business leader to adopt a compli-
ance program that could help to reduce their risk exposure to law enforcement action. 
 
2. Growing legislative and enforcement effort 
 
Growing legislative effort and enforcement actions in combating corporate wrongdoings 
is also an important factor. Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law was in effect in August 2008 
and has been rigorously enforced after 2010s. One landmark case in 2013 involves two lux-
ury liquor producers Maotai and Wuliangye for forming vertical monopoly agreement 
with their sales representatives. NDRC, China’s top Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement 
agency, fined two liquor producers for 450 million RMB (roughly 65 million USD), 
which was 1% of their total annual revenue. Such hefty fine was unheard of in China be-
fore. The hefty fine plus the prominence of the two brand-names, helped the case to reach 
national-wide median attention. 
Other notable legislative development includes the revised Consumer Protection Law in 
2014, the revised Work Safety Law in 2014, the new Environment Protection Law in 2015. 
All the revisions and the newly drafted legislation aimed to increase the consequences for 
Chinese corporation that does not comply with the regulations. In early 2015, the judicial 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 2   2017 
TIEZHENG LI  |  COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE TRAINING IN CHINA 
 
PAGE  73 
interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the application of the China Civil Pro-
cedure Law was also an important milestone, as it has lowered the procedural requirement 
for Non-government organizations (NGOs) to bring a civil lawsuit against a corporation 
on behalf of a collective group. Most of such type of lawsuits are related to environmental 
and consumer protection. Although the Chinese procedure is very different to US class 
action litigation and no punitive damages will be rewarded, it is still an advancement of 
the interest of ordinary citizens against corporate wrongdoings. 
 
3. International expansion 
 
The recent period also witnessed Chinese companies’ global expansion and new compli-
ance challenges aroused from its global operation. Chinese home-grown multinationals 
were under intense scrutiny by the US regulators in the area of sanctions and export con-
trol as well as anti-money laundry. The ZTE case was widely cited as a wake-up call for 
Chinese multinationals to improve their global compliance management. ZTE was fined 
for over 800 million USD for violation of US export control regime in re-selling imported 
US equipment to Iran and North Korea. As part of the settlement agreement with DOC, 
ZTE agreed to establish a compliance program under the supervision of a court appointed 
monitor, who will report to the court on the progress made by ZTE for the next 3 years. 
Failure to build an effective compliance program in accordance of US requirements will 
result in an additional fine of 300 million USD.4 
Another notable case is the 200 million USD fine to the New York brunch of China Ag-
riculture Bank for inadequate effort in managing anti-money laundry compliance. The 
installment of a monitor and the requirement to improve its compliance program were 
also part of the settlement. In both ZTE and China Agriculture Bank cases, the attempt 
to cover up and non-cooperation with government authorities in their investigation has 
costed the companies extra hefty fines. Chinese companies are learning in a hard way the 
culture differences in dealing with US agencies and the US judiciary system and comply-
ing with legal requirements. 
 
4. Government advocacy 
 
Finally, Chinese government played a significant role in encouraging SOEs to build up a 
compliance management system similar to their western peers. China State Asset Admin-
istration and Supervision Commission (SAASC), the supervision agency of SOEs under 
the management of central government, advocated the idea of compliance management 
among central SOEs. Five large SOEs including Sinopec, China Mobile, were selected by 
			
4
  Office of Public Affairs, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross, Jr. Announces $1.19 Billion Penalty for Chinese 
Company’s Export Violations to Iran and North Korea, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE – UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (Mar 7, 2017), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/03/secretary-commerce-wil-
bur-l-ross-jr-announces-119-billion-penalty. 
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SAASC to start a pilot program to study and experiment building up compliance pro-
gram in Chinese SOEs5. SAASC plans to issue a compliance management guideline for all 
central SOEs based on the experiences of these five companies. 
The advocacy from SAASC is a response to the above listed recent developments. SOEs 
were in the epic center of the anti-corruption campaign. NDRC, a powerful regulator, 
did open anti-trust investigation against large SOE Telecom operators. The over 100 cen-
tral SOEs have in total more than 8500 overseas brunches in 150 countries. Their total 
overseas asset has exceeded 5000 billion RMB6.  Compliance management seems to be a 
solution to reduce the risk of hefty fine or allegation of corporate wrongdoings. 
 
II. COMPLIANCE TRAINING IN CHINA: A GROWING INDUSTRY 
 
A. Compliance training in China 
 
Compliance training is an important element of an effective compliance management sys-
tem. It helps company employees to familiarize with policies and procedures, convey 
tones from the top, and foster a culture of integrity. The growing awareness of Chinese 
local companies has created new demand for training programs. 
 
B. Culture clashes in understanding compliance 
 
Compliance and compliance training is quite a new thing for many Chinese domestic 
companies. Current compliance training programs are an excellent place to make obser-
vations on the clash of culture between foreign multinationals and Chinese domestic 
companies. 
 
1. Legal culture difference 
 
In the program, speakers from foreign multinationals often talk about a good culture of 
compliance that should encourage employee “adherence to the spirit and letter of the for-
mal rules”7. But Chinese compliance officers participated in the program, who normally 
have a background in Chinese law, would often dispute the concept. They would rather 
like to understand the law as it is written in black letter.  
It is easier to convince the company and its employee to comply, when a specific provision 
of the law forbids a very precise type of action. For instance, the Chinese Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law contains a requirement for the merchant that the maximum payment 
			
5
  State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration of the State Council, 2016 Report on the progress of rule 
of law in central SOEs, (Mar 31, 2017) http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n103/n2190709/ 
n2281959/n2281991/c2568112/content.html. 
6  Data from SAASC. 
7  BEN W. HEINEMAN. JR., HIGH PERFORMANCE WITH HIGH INTEGRITY (2008). 
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in a raffle promotion should not exceed 5000 Yuan. 5000 Yuan is a very precise require-
ment, which makes employee easy to understand the standard of compliance.  
Many government regulations, especially policies and guidelines from the industrial reg-
ulator, are writing in such a precise way. Oftentimes, it is designed to address a specific 
situation in a particular context. Chinese business people pay high attention to this type 
of micro-management of the government, which could be traced back to China’s history 
of planned economy.  
On the contrary, Chinese business people often ignore the “modern” statute like China 
anti-trust law (China Anti-Monopoly Law) and consumer protection law, as they are 
principle based and do not provide very precise guideline to their business activities. This 
may expose the company to greater risk. 
The different understanding of the meaning of law highlights the importance of compli-
ance training to an effective compliance program. In fact, the purpose of compliance 
training inside the company is for compliance function to have conversation with the 
business people on the practical application of the legal principles. 
 
III. POLITICAL CULTURE DIFFERENCE 
 
The lack of trust is also reflected in the discussion of whistle-blower program. Foreign 
multinationals see whistle-blowing as a channel for employees to raise their concerns. It is 
a duty for people with integrity to report any wrongdoings. 
Many Chinese compliance officers believe most whistle blower, who turn in their col-
leagues, has very negative characters. They believe that once in place, the program would 
certainly be misused for office politics. 
The different attitudes towards whistle blower seems to reveal a deep political culture dif-
ference. During the Chinese Culture Revolution, people were encouraged to spy on each 
other and turn in the friends and family members to the authority for alleged anti-revo-
lutionary behavior. In many cases, it was a political witch hunt that created mistrust in 
the society. 
It is still early to predict how the new trend of interest to compliance management may 
actually prepare Chinese companies to face their global regulatory challenges. Given the 
deep culture differences, compliance training in China has a very difficult task to change 
the mindset of many Chinese companies. 
 
